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Abstract
Most online platforms strive to learn from interactions with consumers, and many engage in
exploration: making potentially suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new information. We
initiate a study of the interplay between exploration and competition: how such platforms balance
the exploration for learning and the competition for consumers. Here consumers play three distinct
roles: they are customers that generate revenue, they are sources of data for learning, and they are
self-interested agents which choose among the competing platforms.
We consider a stylized duopoly model in which two rms face the same multi-armed bandit instance.
Users arrive one by one and choose between the two rms, so that each rm makes progress on its
bandit instance only if it is chosen. We study whether and to what extent competition incentivizes
the adoption of beer bandit algorithms, and whether it leads to welfare increases for consumers. We
nd that stark competition induces rms to commit to a “greedy” bandit algorithm that leads to low
consumer welfare. However, we nd that weakening competition by providing rms with some “free”
consumers incentivizes beer exploration strategies and increases consumer welfare. We investigate
two channels for weakening the competition: relaxing the rationality of consumers and giving one rm
a rst-mover advantage. We provide a mix of theoretical results and numerical simulations.
Our ndings are closely related to the “competition vs. innovation” relationship, a well-studied
theme in economics. ey also elucidate the rst-mover advantage in the digital economy by exploring
the role that data can play as a barrier to entry in online markets.
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1 Introduction
Learning from interactions with users is ubiquitous in modern customer-facing platforms, from product
recommendations to web search to content selection to ne-tuning user interfaces. Many platforms
purposefully implement exploration: making potentially suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new
information. Online platforms routinely deploy A/B tests, and are increasingly adopting more sophisticated
exploration methodologies based on multi-armed bandits, a standard and well-studied framework for
exploration and making decisions under uncertainty (Giins et al., 2011; Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012;
Slivkins, 2019; Laimore and Szepesva´ri, 2020).
In this paper, we initiate a study of the interplay between exploration and competition. Platforms that
engage in exploration typically need to compete against one another; most importantly, they compete for
users. is creates a tension: while exploration may be essential for improving the service tomorrow, it
may degrade quality and make users leave today, in which case there will be less users to learn from. is
may further degrade the platform’s performance relative to competitors who keep learning and improving
from their users, and so forth. Taken to the extreme, such dynamics may create a “death spiral” eect when
the vast majority of customers eventually switch to competitors. Users therefore serve three distinct roles:
they are customers that generate revenue, they are sources of data for learning, and they are self-interested
agents who choose among the competing systems.
e main high-level question that we focus on in this paper is:
How does competition incentivize the adoption of better exploration algorithms? (1)
is translates into a number of more concrete questions. While it is commonly assumed that beer
technology always helps, is this so under competition? Does increased competition lead to higher consumer
welfare? How signicant are “data feedback loops” — when more data leads to more users, which leads to
even more data, etc. — and how they relate to the anti-trust considerations? Finding formalizations that
admit meaningful answers is a major part of the overall challenge.
To answer these questions, we study complex interactions between platforms’ learning dynamics and
users’ self-interested behavior. e choice of a particular technology (exploration algorithm) is no longer
an abstract, static choice with a predetermined outcome for the platform. Instead, we model the algorithms
explicitly, and investigate how they play out in competition over an extended period of time.
1.1 Our model: competing bandits
Competition game. We consider a stylized duopoly model where two rms commit to exploration
strategies and compete for a stream of consumers. We dene a game in which two rms (principals)
simultaneously engage in exploration and compete for users (agents). ese two processes are interlinked,
as exploration decisions are experienced by users and informed by their feedback. We need to specify
several conceptual pieces: how the principals and agents interact, what is the machine learning problem
faced by each principal, and what is the information structure. Each piece can get rather complicated in
isolation, let alone jointly, so we strive for simplicity. us, the key features of our model are as follows:
• A new agent arrives in each round t = 1, 2, . . ., and chooses among the two principals. e principal
chooses an action (e.g., a list of web search results to show to the agent), the user experiences this
action, and reports a reward. All agents have the same “decision rule” for choosing among the
principals given the available information.
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• Each principal faces a basic and well-studied version of the multi-armed bandit problem: for each
arriving agent, it chooses from a xed set of actions (a.k.a. arms) and receives a reward drawn
independently from a xed distribution specic to this action. e reward distributions are initially
unknown (but can be estimated over time from the data).
• Principals simultaneously announce their bandit algorithms before round 1, and cannot change them
aerwards. Each principal’s objective is to maximize its market share (the fraction of users choosing
this principal). Each principal only observes agents that chose this principal.
We investigate several model variants within this framework, where we vary agents’ decision rule and/or
give a rst-mover advantage to one of the principals. In all variants, agents have lile or no information
about other agents’ choices and rewards.
Technology: multi-armed bandit algorithms. To esh out (1), let us elaborate what we mean by ‘beer’
bandit algorithms. In general, comparisons between bandit algorithms are rather subtle, as some algorithms
may be beer for some problem instances and/or time intervals, and worse for some others.
We distinguish three classes of bandit algorithms, based on the prevalent intuition in the area. e
distinction concerns the way in which they resolve the fundamental tradeo between exploration and
exploitation (making optimal myopic decisions using the available data). Going from more primitive to
more sophisticated, these three classes are as follows:
• Greedy algorithms that strive to maximize the reward for the next round given the available informa-
tion. us, they always “exploit” and never explicitly “explore”.
• Exploration-separating algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation: essentially, each round
is dedicated to one and completely ignores the other.
• Adaptive-exploration algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation, and gradually sway the
exploration choices towards more promising alternatives.
In isolation, i.e., in the absence of competition, these classes are fairly well-understood. Greedy
algorithms are terrible for a wide variety of problem instances, precisely because they never explore.
Exploration-separated algorithms learn at a reasonable but mediocre rate across all problem instances.
Adaptive-exploration algorithms are optimal in the worst case, and exponentially improve for “easy”
problem instances. Generally, “beer” algorithms are beer in the long run, but could be worse initially.
While we build on a vast and active research area, we present sucient background in Appendix A so
as to keep this paper accessible to non-specialists.
1.2 Our Results
We oer a mix of theoretical results and numerical simulations. We are mainly interested in qualitative
dierences between the three classes of algorithms in Section 1.1. For numerical simulations, we pick one
representative algorithm from each class. For theoretical results, we allow arbitrary algorithms and focus
on asymptotic dierences in the algorithms’ performance.
eoretical results. We consider a basic Bayesian model. We posit that agents have a common Bayesian
prior on reward distributions, and know the principals’ algorithms. For simplicity, agents do not receive
any information about the previous agents’ choices and rewards. Each agent knows the round (s)he arrives
2
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Figure 1: Inverted-U relationship between competitiveness and algorithms.
in, computes the Bayesian-expected reward for each principal, and use these two numbers to decide which
principal to choose. We refer to this variant as the Bayesian-choice model.
Our results depend crucially on the agents’ decision rule.
• e most obvious decision rule maximizes the Bayesian-expected reward; we refer to it as HardMax.
We nd that HardMax is not conducive to adopting beer algorithms: each principal’s dominant
strategy is to choose the greedy algorithm. Further, we show that HardMax is very sensitive to
tie-breaking: if the tie-breaking is probabilistically biased in favor of one principal, then this principal
has a simple “winning strategy” no maer what the other principal does.
• We dilute the HardMax agents with a small fraction of “random agents” who choose a principal
uniformly at random. We call this model HardMax&Random. We nd that beer algorithms help in a
big way: a suciently beer algorithm is guaranteed to win all non-random agents aer an initial
learning phase. However, there is a substantial caveat: one can defeat any algorithm by interleaving
it with the greedy algorithm. is has two undesirable corollaries: a beer algorithm may sometimes
lose in competition, and a pure Nash equilibrium typically does not exist.
• We further relax the decision rule so that the probability of choosing a given principal varies smoothly
as a function of the dierence between principals’ Bayesian-expected rewards; we call it SoftMax.
For this model, the “beer algorithm wins” result holds under much weaker assumptions on what
constitutes a beer algorithm. is is the most technical result of the paper. e competition in this
seing is necessarily much more relaxed: typically, both principals aract approximately half of the
agents as time goes by (but a beer algorithm would aract slightly more).
All results extend to a much more general version of the multi-armed bandit problem in which the
principal may observe additional feedback before and/or aer each decision, as long as the feedback
distribution does not change over time. In most results, principal’s utility may depend on both the market
share and agents’ rewards.
Economic interpretation: the inverted-U relationship. Interpreting the adoption of beer algorithms
as “innovation”, our ndings can be framed in terms of the inverted-U relationship between competition
and innovation, as in Figure 1.1 is is a well-established concept in the economics literature, dating back
1Here, “innovation” refers to adoption of a beer technology at a substantial R&D expense to a given rm. It is not salient
whether similar ideas and/or technologies already exist elsewhere. Adoption of exploration algorithms tends to require substantial
R&D eort in practice, even if the algorithms themselves are well-known in the research literature (e.g., see Agarwal et al., 2017).
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to Schumpeter (1942), whereby too lile or too much competition is bad for innovation, but intermediate
levels of competition tend to be beer (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005; Vives, 2008).
Our decision rules dier in terms of rationality: from fully rational decisions with HardMax to relaxed
rationality with HardMax&Random to an even more relaxed rationality with SoftMax. e same distinc-
tions also control the severity of competition between the principals: from cut-throat competition with
HardMax to a more relaxed competition with HardMax&Random, to an even more relaxed competition with
SoftMax. Indeed, with HardMax you lose all customers as soon as you fall behind in performance, with
HardMax&Random you get some small market share no maer what, and with SoftMax you are further
guaranteed a market share close to 12 as long as your performance is not much worse than the competition.
e uniform choice among principals corresponds to no rationality and no competition. While agents’
rationality and severity of competition are oen modeled separately in the literature, it is not unusual to
have them modeled with the same “knob” (e.g., Gabaix et al., 2016).
We identify the inverted-U relationship driven by the rationality/competitiveness distinctions outlined
above: from HardMax to HardMax&Random to SoftMax to Uniform. We also nd another, technically
dierent, inverted-U relationship which zeroes in on the HardMax&Random model. We vary rational-
ity/competitiveness inside this model, and track the marginal utility of switching to a beer algorithm.
ese inverted-U relationships are driven by dierent aspects in our model than the ones in the existing
literature in economics. e laer focuses on the tradeo between the R&D costs and the benets that the
improved technology provides in the competition. In our case, the barriers for innovations arise entirely
from the reputational consequences of exploration in competition, even in the absence of R&D costs.
Numerical simulations. We consider a basic frequentist model. We posit that the agents observe signals
about the principals’ past performance, and base their decisions on these signals alone, without invoking
any prior knowledge or beliefs. e performance signals are abstracted and aggregated as a scalar reputation
score for each principal, modeled as a sliding window average of its rewards. us, agents’ decision rule
depends only on the two reputation scores. We refer to this variant as the reputation-choice model.
We rene and expand the theoretical results in several ways.
• We compare HardMax and HardMax&Random decision rules. We nd that the greedy algorithm
oen wins under HardMax, with a strong evidence of the “death spiral” eect mentioned earlier.
As predicted by the theory, beer algorithms prevail if the expected number of “random” users is
suciently large. However, this eect is negligible for smaller parameter values.
• We investigate the rst-mover advantage as a dierent channel to vary the intensity of competition:
from the rst-mover to simultaneous arrival to late-arriver. (We focus on the HardMax decision
rule.) We nd that the rst-mover is incentivized to choose a more advanced exploration algorithm,
whereas the late-arriver is oen incentivized to choose the “greedy algorithm” (more so than under
simultaneous arrival). Consumer welfare is higher under early/late arrival than under simultaneous
entry. We frame these results in terms of an inverted-U relationship.
• We investigate the algorithms’ performance “in isolation”, i.e., without competition. We suggest a new
performance measure to explain why the greedy algorithm is sometimes not the best strategy under
high levels of competition.2 We nd that mean reputation – arguably, the most natural performance
measure “in isolation” – is sometimes not a good predictor for the outcomes under competition.
2Note the discrepancy with our theoretical results on HardMax: there, the greedy algorithm is always the best strategy, mainly
because it is aware of the Bayesian prior (whereas in the simulations the prior is not available).
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• We decompose the rst-mover advantage into two distinct eects: free data to learn from (data
advantage), and a more denite, and possibly beer reputation compared to an entrant (reputation
advantage). We run additional experiments so as to isolate and compare these two eects. We nd
that either eect alone leads to a signicant advantage under competition. e data advantage is
larger than reputation advantage when the incumbent commits to a more advanced bandit algorithm.
Finally, we nd an “amplication eect” of the data advantage: even a small amount thereof gets
amplied under competition, causing a large dierence in eventual market shares.
Economic interpretation: network eects of data. Our model speaks to policy discussions on regu-
lating data-intensive digital platforms (Furman et al., 2019; Sco Morton et al., 2019), and particularly to
the ongoing debate on the role of data in the digital economy. One fundamental question in this debate is
whether data can serve a similar role as traditional “network eects”, creating scenarios when only one rm
can function in the market (Rysman, 2009; Jullien and Sand-Zantman, 2019). e death spiral/amplication
eects mentioned above have a similar avor as network eects: a relatively small amount of exploration
(resp., data advantage) gets amplied under competition and causes the rm to be starved of users (resp.,
take over most of the market). A distinctive feature of our approach is that we explicitly model the learning
problem of the rms and consider them deploying algorithms for solving this problem. us, we do not
explicitly model the network eects, but they arise endogenously from our setup.
Our results highlight that understanding the performance of learning algorithms in isolation does not
necessarily translate to understanding their impact in competition, precisely due to the fact that competition
leads to the endogenous generation of data observed by the rms. Approaches such as Lambrecht and
Tucker (2015); Bajari et al. (2018); Varian (2018) argue that the diminishing returns to scale and scope
of data in isolation mitigate such data feedback loops, but ignore the dierences induced by learning in
isolation versus under competition. Furthermore, explicitly incorporating the interaction between learning
technology and data creation allows us to speak on how data advantages are characterized and amplied
not only by data quantity, but also the increased data quality gathered by beer learning algorithms.
1.3 Further discussion
Signicance. Our theory takes a basic Bayesian approach, a standard perspective in economic theory,
and discovers several strong asymptotic results. e numerical simulations provide a more nuanced and
“non-asymptotic” perspective. In essence, we look for substantial eects within relevant time scales. In fact,
we start our investigation by determining what time scales are relevant in the context of our model.
Our study has a dual purpose: (i) shed light on real-world implications of some typical scenarios, and
(ii) investigate the space of models for describing the real world. As an example to clarify the laer point,
consider the HardMax model with simultaneous entry. It is is not necessarily the most realistic model, but
arguably the most natural one to study a priori. However, our results elucidate the need for more rened
models that allow for “free exploration” (e.g., via random agents or early entry).
Modeling. Our models are stylized in several important respects. Firms compete only on the quality of
service, rather than, say, pricing or the range of products. Agents are myopic: they do not worry about how
their actions impact their future utility.3 Various performance signals available to the users, from personal
experience to word-of-mouth to consumer reports, are abstracted as persistent “reputation scores”, and
3In particular, agents do not aempt to learn over time, to second-guess or game future agents, or to manipulate the principals’
learning algorithms. is is arguably typical in practice, in part because one agent’s inuence tends to be relatively small.
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further simplied to average performance over a time window. On the machine learning side, our setup is
geared to distinguish between “simple” vs. “beer” vs. “smart” bandit algorithms; we are not interested in
state-of-art algorithms for very realistic bandit seings.
We consider two extremes: a simple Bayesian model with full Bayesian rationality and no performance
signals, and a simple frequentist model with reputation scores and no prior knowledge or beliefs. For
the theoretical results, the “no-performance-signals” assumption makes agents’ behavior independent of
a particular realization of the prior. erefore, we summarize each learning algorithm via its Bayesian-
expected rewards, not worrying about its detailed performance on particular realizations of the prior. Such
summarization is essential for formulating lucid and general analytic results, let alone proving them. It
is unclear how to incorporate performance signals in a theoretically tractable model. For the numerical
results, the reputation-choice model accounts for competition in a more direct way, allows to separate
reputation vs. data advantage, and makes our model amenable to numerical simulations. Indeed, simulating
the intricate interplay of learning dynamics and Bayesian priors appears computationally intractable.
Principals’ utilities (and, accordingly, bandit rewards) are not discounted with time.4 While much of
the early work focuses on time-discounted bandits (Giins et al., 2011), non-discounted formulations are
prevalent in the bandits literature over the past two decades (Slivkins, 2019; Laimore and Szepesva´ri,
2020), and beer correspond to practical deployments (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2017). Moreover, the distinctions
between beer and worse bandit algorithms are not as well-understood under time-discounting.
Challenges. Much of the challenge in the theoretical results, both conceptual and technical, was in seing
up the model and the theorems. Apart from zeroing in on the Bayesian-choice model, it was crucial to
interpret the results and intuitions from the literature on multi-armed bandits so as to formulate meaningful
and productive assumptions on bandit algorithms and Bayesian priors.
e numerical investigation is quite challenging even with a stylized model such as ours. An “atomic
experiment” is a competition game between a given pair of bandit algorithms, in a given competition model,
on a given instance of a multi-armed bandit problem (and each such experiment is run many times to
reduce variance). Accordingly, we have a three-dimensional space of atomic experiments one needs to run
and interpret: {pairs of algorithms} x {competition models} x {bandit instances}, and we are looking for
ndings that are consistent across this entire space. It is essential to keep each of the three dimensions
small yet representative. In particular, we need to capture a huge variety of bandit instances with only a
few representative examples. Further, we need a succinct and informative summarization of results within
one atomic experiment and across multiple experiments (e.g., see Table 1).
While amenable to simulations, the reputation-choice model appears dicult to analyze. is is for
several reasons: (i) intricate feedback loop from performance to reputations to users to performance;
(ii) mean reputation, most connected to our intuition, is sometimes a bad predictor in competition (see
Sections 5.2 and 5.6); and (iii) mathematical tools from regret-minimization would only produce “asymptotic”
results, which do not seem to suce. Given the theoretical results on the Bayesian-choice model, and the
fact that we are in the realm of stylized economic models, we believe that resolving rst-order theoretical
questions about the reputation-choice model would not add much value to this paper.
4However, our main theoretical result on the greedy algorithm extends to time-discounted rewards, see Section 4.6.
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2 Related work
Bandits and exploration. Multi-armed bandits (MAB) is an elegant and tractable abstraction for tradeo
between exploration and exploitation: essentially, between acquisition and usage of information. MAB
problems have been studied for many decades by researchers from computer science, operations research,
statistics and economics. e literature on MAB is extremely vast and multi-threaded. e most relevant
thread studies a basic model of MAB with IID rewards and no auxiliary structure, see Appendix A. e
basic model has been extended in many dierent directions, with a considerable amount of work on each:
e.g., payos with a specic structure (e.g., combinatorial, linear, convex or Lipschitz), payo distributions
that change over time, and auxiliary payo-relevant signals. is literature is covered in many books
and surveys. Particularly, see Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012); Slivkins (2019); Laimore and Szepesva´ri
(2020) for background on regret-minimizing formulations, Giins et al. (2011) for Bayesian and Markovian
formulations, and Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006); Slivkins (2019) for connections to economics and game
theory. A discussion of industrial applications of MAB can be found in (Agarwal et al., 2017).
e three-way tradeo between exploration, exploitation and incentives has been studied in several
seings other than ours: incentivizing exploration in a recommendation system (e.g., Che and Ho¨rner,
2018; Frazier et al., 2014; Kremer et al., 2014; Mansour et al., 2020; Bimpikis et al., 2018; Bahar et al., 2016;
Immorlica et al., 2020), dynamic auctions (e.g., Athey and Segal, 2013; Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2010;
Kakade et al., 2013), pay-per-click ad auctions with unknown click probabilities (e.g., Babaio et al., 2014;
Devanur and Kakade, 2009; Babaio et al., 2015), coordinating search and matching by self-interested agents
(Kleinberg et al., 2016), as well as human computation (e.g., Ho et al., 2016; Ghosh and Hummel, 2013;
Singla and Krause, 2013). Bolton and Harris (1999); Keller et al. (2005); Gummadi et al. (2012) studied models
with self-interested agents jointly performing exploration, with no principal to coordinate them.
ere is a supercial similarity — in name only — between this paper and the line of work on “dueling
bandits” (e.g., Yue et al., 2012; Yue and Joachims, 2009). e laer is not about competing bandit algorithms,
but rather about scenarios where in each round two arms are chosen to be presented to a user, and the
algorithm only observes which arm has “won the duel”.
Our seing is closely related to the “dueling algorithms” framework of Immorlica et al. (2011), which
studies competition between two principals, each running an algorithm for the same problem. However,
Immorlica et al. (2011) consider algorithms for oine / full input scenarios, and posit binary (win/lose)
payos for the principals. Similarly, Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2017, 2019) study competition between
oine learning algorithms. Whereas we focus on bandit algorithms and competition for users.
Other related work in economics. e competition vs. innovation relationship and the inverted-U shape
thereof have been introduced in a classic book (Schumpeter, 1942), and remained an important theme in
the literature ever since (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005; Vives, 2008). Production costs aside, this literature treats
innovation as a priori benecial for the rm. Our seing is very dierent, as innovation in exploration
algorithms may potentially hurt the rm.
ere is a literature that studies the interaction between learning-by-doing and competition (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1983; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988; Cabral and Riordan, 1994). In these models, rms learn while
competing against each other where a rm aracting more consumers reduces its per-unit production costs.
However, our model focuses on rms learning product quality (as opposed to reducing production costs)
and the impact that this learning has on aracting consumers.
A line of work on platform competition, starting with Rysman (2009), concerns competition between
rms (platforms) that improve as they aract more users (network eect); see Weyl and White (2014) for
a recent survey. is literature is not concerned with innovation, and typically models network eects
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exogenously, whereas in our model network eects are endogenous: they are created by MAB algorithms,
an essential part of the model. A nascent literature studies whether and when network eects manifest
themselves in data-intensive markets (Prufer and Schomu¨ller, 2017; Hagiu and Wright, 2020), but typically
models learning as a reduced-form function of past consumer history and focus on the role of prices.
Schmalensee (1982); Bagwell (1990) investigate how buyer uncertainty about product quality can serve
as a barrier to entry for late arrivers. We observe a similar eect when we investigate the role that reputation
can serve as a barrier to entry. However, in our model this eect is further strengthened by the fact that the
rms have to learn while competing adding that the incumbent may not only have a reputational advantage,
but additionally has a further advantage due to the data it acquires in the incumbency period. us, our
model also highlights the role that data can serve as a barrier to entry in online markets which has similarly
been noted in De Corniere and Taylor (2020). For an extensive overview of the other channels through
which rst-mover advantages can lead to a competitive advantage, see Kerin et al. (1992).
Relaxed versions of rationality similar to ours are found in several notable lines of work. For example,
“random agents” (a.k.a. noise traders) can side-step the “no-trade theorem” (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982), a
famous impossibility result in nancial economics. e SoftMax model is closely related to the literature
on product dierentiation, starting from Hotelling (1929), see Perlo and Salop (1985) for a notable later
paper. ere is a large literature on non-existence of equilibria due to small deviations (which is related to
the corresponding result for HardMax&Random), starting with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in the context
of health insurance markets. Notable recent papers (Veiga and Weyl, 2016; Azevedo and Golieb, 2017)
emphasize the distinction between HardMax and versions of SoftMax.
We use rst-mover advantage and relaxed versions of rationality to model varying competition, instead
of classic “market competitiveness” measures such as the Lerner Index or the Herndahl-Hirschman Index
(Tirole, 1988). e laer measures rely on ex-post observable aributes of a market such as prices or market
shares. Neither is applicable to our seing, since there are no prices, and market shares are endogenous.
3 Our model in detail
Let us dene the basic model; our theoretical results admit some extensions, detailed in Section 4.6.
Principals and agents. ere are two principals and T agents, denoted, resp., principal i ∈ {1, 2} and
agent t ∈ [T ]. e game proceeds in (global) rounds. In each round t ∈ [T ], the following interaction takes
place. Agent t arrives and chooses a principal it ∈ {1, 2}. e principal chooses action at ∈ A, where A is
a xed set of actions (same for both principals and all rounds).5 e agent experiences this action, receives
a reward rt ∈ {0, 1}, and reports it back to the principal. We posit stochastic rewards: whenever a given
action a ∈ A is chosen, the reward is an independent draw from Bernoulli distribution with mean µa. e
mean rewards µa are xed over time, and initially not known to anybody. Each principal is completely
unaware of the rounds when the other principal is chosen.
Each principal i commits to a learning algorithm algi before round 1, and uses this algorithm throughout.
e algorithm follows the protocol of multi-armed bandits (MAB). Namely, it proceeds in time-steps:6 each
time it is called, it outputs an action from A, and inputs a reward for this action. algi is called only in
global rounds when principal i is chosen.
Agents’ response. Each agent t forms a reward estimate ESTi(t) ∈ [0, 1] for each principal i, and chooses
5roughout, we use ‘action’ and ‘arm’ interchangeably, as common in the literature on multi-armed bandits.
6ese time-steps will sometimes be referred to as local steps/rounds, so as to distinguish them from “global rounds” dened
before. We will omit the global vs. local distinction when clear from the context.
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∆t := EST1(t)− EST2(t)
pt = prob. of choosing principal 1
1/2
1
0 1−1
Figure 2: e three models for fresp: HardMax is thick blue, HardMax&Random is slim red, and SoftMax is the dashed curve.
the principal based on these reward estimates. Specically, principal 1 is chosen with probability
pt = fresp ( EST1(t)− EST2(t) ) , (2)
where fresp : [−1, 1]→ [0, 1] is the response function, same for all agents and known to everyone.
We assume that fresp is monotonically non-decreasing, is larger than 1/2 on the interval (0, 1], and
smaller than 1/2 on the interval [−1, 0). We consider three specic models (see Figure 2):
• HardMax: fresp equals 0 on the interval [−1, 0) and 1 on the interval (0, 1]. In words, a HardMax
agent deterministically chooses a principal with a higher reward estimate.
• HardMax&Random: fresp equals 0 on the interval [−1, 0) and 1− 0 on the interval (0, 1], for some
constant 0 ∈ (0, 12). In words, each agent is a HardMax agent with probability 1− 20, and makes a
random choice otherwise.
• SoftMax: fresp(·) is bounded away from 0 and 1, and “smooth” around 0 (see Section 4.4).
Bayesian vs. frequentist. We consider two model variants, Bayesian and frequentist. e main dierence
between the two concerns the agents’ reward estimates ESTi(t).
• In the Bayesian-choice model, the mean reward vector µ = (µa : a ∈ A) is drawn from a common
Bayesian prior Pmean. Agents know the principals’ algorithms. eir reward estimates are dened as
posterior mean rewards: ESTi(t) = PMRi(t) := E [ rt | it = i ] for each agent t and principal i.
• In the reputation-choice model, agents’ reward estimate for a given principal is the average reward of
the last M agents that chose this principal (interpreted as a reputation score). To make the reputation
score meaningful initially, each principal enjoys a “warm start”: additional T0 agents arrive before
the game starts, and interact with the principal as described above.
Competition game. Some of our results explicitly study the game between the two principals, termed the
competition game. We model it as a simultaneous-move game: before the rst agent arrives, each principal
commits to an MAB algorithm. us, choosing a pure strategy in this game corresponds to choosing an
MAB algorithm. Principal’s utility is dened as the market share, i.e., the number of agents that chose this
principal. Principals are risk-neutral, in the sense that they optimize their expected utility.
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4 eoretical results: the Bayesian-choice model
In this section, we present our theoretical results for the Bayesian-choice model. While we provide intuition
and (some) proof sketches, the detailed proofs are deferred to Appendix D.
4.1 Preliminaries
Notation. Let rewi(n) denote the realized reward of principal i at local step n. For a global round t, let
ni(t) denote the number of global rounds before t in which principal i is chosen. Note that
PMRi(t) := E [ rt | it = i ] = E [ rewi(ni(t) + 1) ] .
Assumptions. We make two mild assumptions on the prior. First, each arm a can be the best:
∀a ∈ A : Pr
µ∼Pmean
[
µa > µa′ ∀a′ ∈ A
]
> 0. (3)
Second, actions’ posterior mean rewards are pairwise distinct given any feasible history h:7
E[µa | h] 6= E[µa′ | h] ∀a, a′ ∈ A. (4)
In particular, prior mean rewards of actions are pairwise distinct: E[µa] 6= E[µ′a] for any a, a′ ∈ A.
In Appendix C, we provide two examples for which property (4) is ‘generic’, in the sense that it can be
enforced almost surely by a small random perturbation of the prior. e two examples concern, resp., Beta
priors and priors with a nite support, and focus on priors Pmean that are independent across arms.
MAB algorithms. We consider two (Bayesian) greedy algorithms. e rst one, called BayesianGreedy,
chooses an arm a with the largest posterior mean reward E[µa | ·] given all information currently available
to the algorithm. e second algorithm, called StaticGreedy, chooses an arm a with the largest prior
mean reward E[µa], and uses this arm in all rounds. In both algorithms, ties are broken arbitrarily.
We characterize the inherent quality of an MAB algorithm in terms of its Bayesian Instantaneous Regret
(henceforth, BIR), a standard notion from machine learning:
BIRi(n) := E
[
max
a∈A
µa − rewi(n)
]
. (5)
We are primarily interested in how fast BIR decreases with n. (We treat the number of arms as a constant.)
Intuitively, (much) beer MAB algorithms tend to have a (much) smaller BIR, see Appendix A for background.
An algorithm is called Bayesian-monotone if it can only get beer over time: rewi(·) is non-decreasing
(and therefore BIR(·) is non-decreasing). We argue this is a mild assumption, see Appendix B.
4.2 Full rationality: HardMax
We posit fully rational agents, in the sense that their response function is HardMax. We show that principals
are not incentivized to explore— i.e., to deviate from BayesianGreedy. e core technical result is that if
one principal adopts BayesianGreedy, then the other principal loses all agents as soon as he deviates.
To make this more precise, let us dene what it means for MAB algorithms to deviate from each other.
7e history of an MAB algorithm at a given step comprises the chosen actions and the observed rewards in all previous steps.
e history is feasible if for each arm-reward pair (a, r) in the history, r is in the support of the reward distribution for a.
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Denition 4.1. Two MAB algorithms deviate at (local) step n if there is a set H of histories over the
previous local steps such that both algorithms lead to H with positive probability, and choose dierent
distributions over arms given any history h ∈ H . e two algorithms deviate starting from step n0 if
n = n0 is the smallest step when they deviate.
eorem4.2. Assume HardMax response functionwith fair tie-breaking. Assume that alg1 is BayesianGreedy,
and alg2 deviates from BayesianGreedy starting from some (local) step n0 < T . en all agents in global
rounds t ≥ n0 select principal 1.
Corollary 4.3. e competition game has a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose BayesianGreedy.
is holds even if the principals can only choose from restricted strategy sets which include BayesianGreedy.
e proof of eorem 4.2 relies on two key lemmas: that deviating from BayesianGreedy implies a
strictly smaller Bayesian-expected reward, and that HardMax implies a “sudden-death” property: if one
agent chooses principal 1 with certainty, then so do all subsequent agents. We re-use both lemmas in later
results, so we state them in sucient generality. In particular, Lemma 4.4 works for any response function
because it only considers the performance of each algorithm without competition.
Lemma 4.4. Assume that alg1 is BayesianGreedy, and alg2 deviates from BayesianGreedy starting
from some (local) step n0 < T . en rew1(n0) > rew2(n0). is holds for any response function fresp.
Lemma 4.5. Consider HardMax response function with fresp(0) ≥ 12 . Suppose alg1 is Bayesian-monotone,
and PMR1(t0) > PMR2(t0) for some global round t0. en PMR1(t) > PMR2(t) for all subsequent rounds t.
e remainder of the proof of eorem 4.2 uses the conclusion of one lemma to derive the precondition
for another, i.e., goes from rew1(n0) > rew2(n0) to PMR1(n0) > PMR2(n0). e subtlety one needs to deal
with is that the principal’s “local” round corresponding to a given “global” round is a random quantity due
to the random tie-breaking.
Biased tie-breaking. e HardMax model is very sensitive to the tie-breaking rule. For starters, if ties are
broken deterministically in favor of principal 1, then principal 1 can get all agents no maer what the other
principal does, simply by using StaticGreedy.
eorem 4.6. Assume HardMax response function with fresp(0) = 1 (ties are always broken in favor of
principal 1). If alg1 is StaticGreedy, then all agents choose principal 1.
Proof Sketch. Agent 1 chooses principal 1 because of the tie-breaking rule. Since StaticGreedy is trivially
Bayesian-monotone, all the subsequent agents choose principal 1 by an induction argument similar to the
one in the proof of Lemma 4.5.
A more challenging scenario is when the tie-breaking is biased in favor of principal 1, but not deter-
ministically so: fresp(0) > 12 . en this principal also has a “winning strategy” no maer what the other
principal does. Specically, principal 1 can get all but the rst few agents, under a mild technical assumption
that BayesianGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy. Principal 1 can use BayesianGreedy, or any other
Bayesian-monotone MAB algorithm that coincides with BayesianGreedy in the rst few steps.
eorem 4.7. Assume HardMax response function with fresp(0) > 12 (i.e., tie-breaking is biased in favor
of principal 1). Assume the prior P is such that BayesianGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy starting
from some step n0. Suppose that principal 1 runs a Bayesian-monotone MAB algorithm that coincides with
BayesianGreedy in the rst n0 steps. en all agents t ≥ n0 choose principal 1.
e proof re-uses Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5, which do not rely on fair tie-breaking.
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4.3 Relaxed rationality: HardMax&Random
Consider the HardMax&Random response model, where each principal is chosen with some positive baseline
probability. Informally, we nd that:
A much beer algorithm wins big. (6)
In more detail, a principal with asymptotically beer BIR wins by a large margin: aer a “learning phase” of
constant duration, all agents choose this principal with maximal possible probability fresp(1). For example,
a principal with BIR(n) ≤ O˜(n−1/2) prevails over a principal with BIR(n) ≥ Ω(n−1/3).
To state this result, we need to express a property that alg1 eventually catches up and surpasses alg2,
even if initially it receives only a fraction of trac. We assume that both algorithms run indenitely and
do not depend on the time horizon T ; call such algorithms T -oblivious. In particular, their BIR does not
depend on the time horizon T of the game. en this property can be formalized as:
(∀ > 0) BIR1(n)
BIR2(n)
→ 0. (7)
In fact, a weaker version of (7) suces: denoting 0 = fresp(−1), for some constant n0 we have
(∀n ≥ n0) BIR1(0 n/2)
BIR2(n)
< 1/2. (8)
If this holds, we say that alg1 BIR-dominates alg2 starting from (local) step n0.
We also need a mild technical assumption that BIR2(·) is not extremely small: for some constant m0,
(∀n ≥ m0) BIR2(n) > 4 e−0 n/12. (9)
us, the main result is stated as follows:
eorem 4.8. Assume HardMax&Random response function. Suppose algorithms alg1, alg2 are Bayesian-
monotone and T -oblivious, and (9) holds. If alg1 BIR-dominates alg2 starting from step n0, then each agent
t ≥ max(n0,m0) chooses principal 1 with probability fresp(1) = 1− 0 (which is the largest possible).
We’d like to use eorem 4.8 to conclude that a (much) beer algorithm prevails in equilibrium. Indeed,
this holds if the principals can only choose from a nite set of MAB algorithms.
Denition 4.9. A nite competition game is a version of the competition game between the two principals
in which they can only choose from a nite set of MAB algorithms, which are called feasible. All feasible
algorithms are assumed to be Bayesian-monotone and T -oblivious, and to satisfy (9).
Corollary 4.10. Assume HardMax&Random response function. Consider the nite competition game with a
feasible algorithm alg which BIR-dominates all other feasible algorithms. en, for any suciently large time
horizon T , this game has a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
Counterpoint: A little greedy goes a long way. Given any Bayesian-monotone MAB algorithm alg
other than BayesianGreedy, we design a modied algorithm which “mixes in” some greedy choices
(and consequently learns at a slower rate), yet prevails over alg in the competition game. us, we
have a counterpoint to (6): even under HardMax&Random, a beer algorithm may lose in competition.
e corresponding counterpoint to Corollary 4.10 states that non-greedy algorithms are not chosen in
equilibrium.
e modied algorithm, called the greedy modication of alg with mixing parameter p ∈ (0, 1), is
dened as follows. Suppose alg deviates from BayesianGreedy starting from some (local) step n0. en
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1. e modied algorithm coincides with BayesianGreedy for the rst n0 − 1 steps;
2. In each step n ≥ n0, alg is invoked with probability 1 − p, and with the remaining probability p
does the “greedy choice”: chooses an action with the largest posterior mean reward given the current
information collected by alg.
3. e modied algorithm does not record the “greedy choice” steps in its data set.8
Note that the modied algorithm is another pure strategy in the competition game between the two
principals, not a mixed strategy that randomizes between alg and the greedy algorithm.
We nd that the greedy modication prevails in competition if the mixing parameter is small enough.
eorem 4.11. Consider a symmetric HardMax&Random response function fresp with baseline probability
0 = fresp(−1). Suppose alg1 is Bayesian-monotone, and deviates from BayesianGreedy starting from some
step n0. Let alg2 be the greedy modication of alg1 with mixing parameter p > 0 such that (1− 0)(1−p) >
0. en each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal 2 with probability 1− 0 (which is the largest possible).
Let us analyze the BIR of the greedy modication (we will use it for what follows). Use alg1 and alg2
as in the theorem. For each n ∈ N, let Mn be the number of times alg1 is invoked in the rst n steps of
alg2. Let alggr be a hypothetical algorithm which at each step n outputs the “Bayesian-greedy choice”
based on the data collected by alg1 in the rst n− 1 steps. Let BIRgr(n) be the BIR of this algorithm. Let
reg2(n) = n ·maxa µa − rew2(n) be the (frequentist) instantaneous regret of alg2. en
E [ reg2(n) |Mn = m ] = (1− p) · BIR1(m) + p · BIRgr(m).
BIR2(n) = E [ (1− p) · BIR1(Mn) + p · BIRgr(Mn) ] . (10)
Let us show how alg1 can be a beer algorithm than its greedy modication alg2. We need to assume
that alg1 is (much) beer than the greedy step alggr if the laer is computed on a fraction of the data.
Formally, we posit a convex function f(·) and m0 > 0 such that
BIRgr(n) ≥ f(n) and f (E[Mn] ) ≥ 2 BIR1(n) ∀n ≥ m0.
en by (10) and Jensen’s inequality, for each step n ≥ m0 we have
BIR2(n) ≥ E [ BIRgr(Mn) ] ≥ E [ f(Mn) ] ≥ f (E[Mn] ) ≥ 2 BIR1(n).
Second, let us argue that alg2 is Bayesian-monotone. is follows from (10) since both alg1 and alggr
are Bayesian-monotone. e laer follows from a “monotonicity-in-information” property of the “greedy
step”: essentially, it can only get beer with more information (see Lemma B.1).
us, the greedy modication is benecial in competition and keeps us inside the set of Bayesian-
monotone MAB algorithms. Consequently, if the principals are restricted to choosing Bayesian-monotone
MAB algorithms, then non-greedy algorithms cannot be chosen in equilibrium.
8In other words: in the subsequent rounds, as far as the modied algorithm is concerned, the “greedy choice” steps have never
happened. While it is usually more ecient to consider all available data, this simplication enables a cleaner comparison between
the two algorithms. Also, it makes for a cleaner setup: otherwise, just to make the modied algorithm well-dened, we’d need to
assume that alg1 is a mapping from step-n histories to actions, for each step n. is is usually OK – most bandit algorithms have
this shape anyway – but it prohibits alg1 to correlate its internal randomness across steps.
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Corollary 4.12. Posit a symmetric HardMax&Random response function. Suppose both principals can only
choose from Bayesian-monotone MAB algorithms. en for any time horizon T , the only possible pure Nash
equilibrium is one where both principals choose BayesianGreedy. Moreover, no pure Nash equilibrium exists
when some algorithm BIR-dominates BayesianGreedy and T is suciently large. ese conclusions hold
even if each principal’s strategy set is a subset of Bayesian-monotone MAB algorithms that is closed under the
greedy modication.9
4.4 SoftMax response function
For the SoftMax model, we derive a “beer algorithm wins” result under a much weaker version of
BIR-dominance. We start with a formal denition of SoftMax:
Denition 4.13. A response function fresp is SoftMax if the following conditions hold:
• fresp(·) is bounded away from 0 and 1: fresp(·) ∈ [, 1− ] for some  ∈ (0, 12),
• the response function fresp(·) is “smooth” around 0:
∃ constants δ0, c0, c′0 > 0 ∀x ∈ [−δ0, δ0] c0 ≤ f ′resp(x) ≤ c′0. (11)
• fair tie-breaking: fresp(0) = 12 .
Remark 4.14. is denition is fruitful when parameters c0 and c′0 are close to 12 . roughout, we assume
that alg1 is beer than alg2, and obtain results parameterized by c0. By symmetry, one could assume that
alg2 is beer than alg1, and obtain similar results parameterized by c′0.
For the sake of intuition, let us derive a version of eorem 4.8, with the same assumptions about the
algorithms and essentially the same proof. e conclusion is much weaker, though: we can only guarantee
that each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal 1 with probability slightly larger than 12 . is is essentially
unavoidable in a typical case when both algorithms satisfy BIR(n)→ 0, by Denition 4.13.
eorem 4.15. Assume SoftMax response function. Suppose algorithms alg1, alg2 satisfy the assumptions
in eorem 4.8. en each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal 1 with probability
Pr[it = 1] ≥ 12 + c04 BIR2(t). (12)
Proof Sketch. We follow the steps in the proof of eorem 4.8 to derive
PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) ≥ BIR2(t)/2− q, where q = exp(−0t/12).
is is at least BIR2(t)/4 by (9). en (12) follows by the smoothness condition (11).
Let us relax the notion of BIR-dominance so that the constant multiplicative factors in (8), namely 0/2
and 12 , are replaced by constants that can be arbitrarily close to 1.
Denition 4.16. Suppose MAB algorithms alg1, alg2 are T -oblivious. Say that alg1 weakly BIR-dominates
alg2 if there exist absolute constants β0, α0 ∈ (0, 1/2) and n0 ∈ N such that
(∀n ≥ n0) BIR1((1− β0)n)
BIR2(n)
< 1− α0. (13)
9at is, the strategy set of each principal consists of some (but not necessarily all) Bayesian-monotone MAB algorithms, and
contains the greedy modication for each algorithms in this set and each mixing parameter p.
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Now we are ready to state the main result for SoftMax:
eorem 4.17. Assume the SoftMax response function. Suppose algorithms alg1, alg2 are Bayesian-
monotone andT -oblivious, and alg1 weakly-BIR-dominates alg2. Posit mild technical assumptions: BIR1(n)→
0 and that BIR2 cannot be extremely small, namely:
(∃m0 ∀n ≥ m0) BIR2(n) ≥ 4
α0
exp
(−n min{0, 1/8}
12
)
. (14)
en there exists some t0 such that each agent t ≥ t0 chooses principal 1 with probability
Pr[it = 1] ≥ 12 + 14 c0 α0 BIR2(t). (15)
Proof Sketch. e main idea is that even though alg1 may have a slower rate of learning in the beginning,
it will gradually catch up and surpass alg2. We distinguish two phases. In the rst phase, alg1 receives a
random agent with probability at least fresp(−1) = 0 in each round. Since BIR1 tends to 0, the dierence
in BIRs between the two algorithms is also diminishing. Due to the SoftMax response function, alg1
aracts each agent with probability at least 1/2−O(β0) aer a sucient number of rounds. en the game
enters the second phase: both algorithms receive agents at a rate close to 12 , and the fractions of agents
received by both algorithms — n1(t)/t and n2(t)/t — also converge to 12 . At the end of the second phase
and in each global round aerwards, the counts n1(t) and n2(t) satisfy the weak BIR-dominance condition,
in the sense that they both are larger than n0 and n1(t) ≥ (1− β0) n2(t). At this point, alg1 actually has
smaller BIR, which reected in the PMRs eventually. Accordingly, from then on alg1 aracts agents at a
rate slightly larger than 12 . We prove that the “bump” over
1
2 is at least on the order of BIR2(t).
As in the previous subsection, we can state a game-theoretic corollary for the nite competition game
(as in Denition 4.9). We need a mild technical assumption that cumulative Bayesian regret (BReg) tends to
innity. BReg is a standard notion from the literature (along with BIR):
BReg(n) := n · E
µ∼Pmean
[
max
a∈A
µa
]
− E
[
n∑
m=1
rew(m)
]
=
n∑
m=1
BIR(m). (16)
Corollary 4.18. Assume SoftMax response function. Consider the nite competition game in which all
feasible algorithms satisfy BReg(n)→∞.10 Suppose a feasible algorithm alg BIR-dominates all others. en,
for any suciently large time horizon T , there is a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
4.5 Economic implications
We frame our contributions in terms of the relationship between competitiveness and rationality on one
side, and adoption of beer algorithms on the other. Recall that both competitiveness (of the game between
the two principals) and rationality (of the agents) are controlled by the response function fresp.
Main story. Our main story concerns the nite competition game between the two principals where
one allowed algorithm alg is “beer” than the others. We track whether and when alg is chosen in
an equilibrium. We vary competitiveness/rationality by changing the response function from HardMax
(full rationality, very competitive environment) to HardMax&Random to SoftMax (less rationality and
competition). Our conclusions are as follows:
10BReg(n)→∞ is a mild non-degeneracy condition, see Appendix A for background.
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Competitiveness/Rationality
Beer algorithm in equilibrium
Uniform SoftMax HardMax&Random HardMax
Figure 3: e stylized inverted-U relationship in the “main story”.
• Under HardMax, no innovation: BayesianGreedy is chosen over alg.
• Under HardMax&Random, some innovation: alg is chosen as long as it BIR-dominates.
• Under SoftMax, more innovation: alg is chosen as long as it weakly-BIR-dominates.11
ese conclusions follow, respectively, from Corollaries 4.3, 4.10 and 4.18. Further, we consider the uniform
choice between the principals. It corresponds to the least amount of rationality and competition, and (when
principals’ utility is the number of agents) uniform choice provides no incentives to innovate.12 us, we
have an inverted-U relationship, see Figure 3.
Secondary story. Let us zoom in on the symmetric HardMax&Random model. Competitiveness and
rationality within this model are controlled by the baseline probability 0 = fresp(−1), which goes
smoothly between the two extremes of HardMax (0 = 0) and the uniform choice (0 = 12 ). Smaller 0
corresponds to increased rationality and increased competitiveness. For clarity, we assume that principal’s
utility is the number of agents.
We consider the marginal utility of switching to a beer algorithm. Suppose initially both principals use
some algorithm alg, and principal 1 ponders switching to another algorithm alg’ which BIR-dominates
alg. We are interested in the marginal utility of this switch. en:
• 0 = 0 (HardMax): the marginal utility can be negative if alg is BayesianGreedy.
• 0 near 0: only a small marginal utility can be guaranteed, as it may take a long time for alg′ to
“catch up” with alg, and hence less time to reap the benets.
• “medium-range” 0: large marginal utility, as alg′ learns fast and gets most agents.
• 0 near 12 : small marginal utility, as principal 1 gets most agents for free no maer what.
e familiar inverted-U shape is depicted in Figure 4.
4.6 Extensions
Our theoretical results can be extended beyond the basic model in Section 3.
Reward-dependent utility. Except for Corollary 4.18, our results allow a more general notion of principal’s
utility that can depend on both the market share and agents’ rewards. Namely, principal i collects Ui(rt)
11is is a weaker condition, the beer algorithm is chosen in a broader range of scenarios.
12On the other hand, if principals’ utility is aligned with agents’ welfare, then a monopolist principal is incentivized to choose
the best possible MAB algorithm (namely, to minimize cumulative Bayesian regret BReg(T )). Accordingly, monopoly would result
in beer social welfare than competition, as the laer is likely to split the market and cause each principal to learn more slowly.
is is a very generic and well-known eect regarding economies of scale.
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Figure 4: e stylized inverted-U relationship from the “secondary story”
units of utility in each global round t when she is chosen (and 0 otherwise), where Ui(·) is some xed
non-decreasing function with Ui(0) > 0. In a formula, Ui :=
∑T
t=1 1{ it=i } · Ui(rr).
Time-discounted utility. eorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.3 holds under a more general model which allows
time-discounting: namely, the utility of each principal i in each global round t is Ui,t(rt) if this principal is
chosen, and 0 otherwise, where Ui,t(·) is an arbitrary non-decreasing function with Ui,t(0) > 0.
Arbitrary reward distributions. Bernoulli rewards can be extended to arbitrary reward distributions.
For each arm a ∈ A there is a parametric family ψa(·) of reward distributions, parameterized by the mean
reward. Whenever arm a is chosen, the reward is drawn independently from distribution ψa(µa). e prior
Pmean and the distributions (ψa(·) : a ∈ A) constitute the (full) Bayesian prior on rewards.
MAB extensions. Our results carry over, with lile or no modication of the proofs, to much more general
versions of MAB, as long as it satises the i.i.d. property. In each round, an algorithm can see a context
before choosing an action (as in contextual bandits) and/or additional feedback other than the reward aer
the reward is chosen (as in, e.g., semi-bandits), as long as the contexts are drawn from a xed distribution,
and the (reward, feedback) pair is drawn from a xed distribution that depends only on the context and the
chosen action. e Bayesian prior P needs to be a more complicated object, to make sure that PMR and
BIR are well-dened. Mean rewards may also have a known structure, such as Lipschitzness, convexity, or
linearity; such structure can be incorporated via P . All these extensions have been studied extensively in
the literature on MAB, and account for a substantial segment thereof. Background can be found in any of
the recent books on MAB (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012; Slivkins, 2019; Laimore and Szepesva´ri, 2020).
BIR can depend on T . Many MAB algorithms are parameterized by the time horizon T , and their regret
bounds usually include polylog(T ). In particular, a typical regret bound for BIR is
BIR(n | T ) ≤ polylog(T ) · n−γ for some γ ∈ (0, 12 ]. (17)
Here we write BIR(n | T ) to emphasize the dependence on T . Accordingly, BIR-dominance can be redened
as follows: there exists a number T0 and a function n0(T ) ∈ polylog(T ) such that
(∀T ≥ T0, n ≥ n0(T )) BIR1(0n/2 | T )
BIR2(n | T ) <
1
2
. (18)
Weak BIR-dominance can be redened similarly. eorem 4.8 and 4.15 easily extend to these versions.
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5 Numerical simulations: the reputation-choice model
In this section we present our numerical simulations. As discussed in the Introduction, we focus on the
reputation-choice model, whereby each agent chooses the rm with a maximal reputation score, modeled as
a sliding window average of its rewards. While we experiment with various MAB instances and parameter
seings, we only report on selected, representative experiments. Additional plots and tables are provided in
Appendix E. Unless noted otherwise, our ndings are based on and consistent with all these experiments.
5.1 Experiment setup
Competition model. All experiments use HardMax response function (without mentioning it), except
Section 5.5 where we use HardMax&Random agents. In some of our experiments, one rm is the “incumbent”
who enters the market before the other (“late entrant”), and therefore enjoys a rst-mover advantage.
Formally, the incumbent enjoys additional X rounds of the “warm start”. We treat X as an exogenous
element of the model, and study the consequences for a xed X .
MAB algorithms. We consider the three classes of bandit algorithms discussed in Section 1.1 (and in
more detail in Appendix A), and look for qualitative dierences between them. We take a representative
algorithm from each class. Our pilot experiments indicate that our ndings do not change substan-
tially if other representative algorithms are chosen. We use ThompsonSampling (TS) from the “adaptive-
exploration” algorithms, BayesianEpsilonGreedy (BEG) from the “exploration-separating” algorithms,13
and BayesianGreedy (BG) algorithm as in Section 4.1. For ease of comparison, all three algorithms are
parameterized with the same “fake” Bayesian prior: namely, the mean reward of each arm is drawn inde-
pendently from a Beta(1, 1) distribution. Recall that Beta priors with 0-1 rewards form a conjugate family,
which allows for simple posterior updates.
MAB instances. We consider instances with K = 10 arms. Since we focus on 0-1 rewards, an instance
of the MAB problem is specied by the mean reward vector (µ(a) : a ∈ A). Initially this vector is drawn
from some distribution, termed MAB instance. We consider three MAB instances:
1. Needle-In-Haystack: one arm (the “needle”) is chosen uniformly at random. is arm has mean reward
.7, and the remaining ones have mean reward .5.
2. Uniform instance: the mean reward of each arm is drawn independently and uniformly from [1/4, 3/4].
3. Heavy-Tail instance: the mean reward of each arm is drawn independently from Beta(.6, .6) distribu-
tion (which is known to have substantial “tail probabilities”).
We argue that these MAB instances are (somewhat) representative. Consider the “gap” between the best
and the second-best arm, an essential parameter in the literature on MAB. e “gap” is xed in Needle-in-
Haystack, spread over a wide spectrum of values under the Uniform instance, and is spread but focused on
the large values under the Heavy-Tail instance. We also ran smaller experiments with versions of these
instances, and achieved similar qualitative results.
Simulation details. For each MAB instance we draw N = 1000 mean reward vectors independently from
the corresponding distribution. We use this same collection of mean reward vectors for all experiments
13In each round, BayesianEpsilonGreedy algorithm explores uniformly with a predetermined probability , and “exploits”
with the remaining probability, choosing an arm with maximal posterior mean reward given the current data. We use  = 5%
throughout. Our pilot experiments show that choosing a dierent  does not qualitatively change the results.
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with this MAB instance. For each mean reward vector we draw a table of realized rewards (realization
table), and use this same table for all experiments on this mean reward vector. is ensures that dierences
in algorithm performance are not due to noise in the realizations but due to dierences in the algorithms in
the dierent experimental seings.
More specically, the realization table is a 0-1 matrixW withK columns which correspond to arms, and
T + Tmax rows, which correspond to rounds. Here Tmax is the maximal duration of the “warm start” in our
experiments, i.e., the maximal value of X + T0. For each arm a, each value W (·, a) is drawn independently
from Bernoulli distribution with expectation µ(a). en in each experiment, the reward of this arm in
round t of the warm start is taken to be W (t, a), and its reward in round t of the game is W (Tmax + t, a).
For the reputation scores, we x the sliding window sizeM = 100. We found that lower values induced
too much random noise in the results, and increasing M further did not make a qualitative dierence.
Unless otherwise noted, we used T = 2000.
Terminology. Following a standard game-theoretic terminology, algorithm Alg1 (weakly) dominates
algorithm Alg2 for a given rm if Alg1 provides a larger (or equal) market share than Alg2 at the end of
the game. An algorithm is a (weakly) dominant strategy for the rm if it (weakly) dominates all other
algorithms. is is for a particular MAB instance and a particular selection of the game parameters.
Running time. e simulations are computationally intensive. An experiment on a particular MAB
instance comprised multiple runs of the competition game: N mean reward vectors times 9 pairs of
algorithms times three values for the warm start. We used a parallel implementation over a cluster of 12 2.2
GHz CPU cores, with 8 GB RAM per core. Each experiment took about 10 hours.
5.2 Performance in Isolation
We start with a pilot experiment in which we investigate each algorithm’s performance “in isolation”:
in a stand-alone MAB problem without competition. We focus on reputation scores generated by each
algorithm. We conrm that algorithms’ performance is ordered as we’d expect: ThompsonSampling >
BayesianEpsilonGreedy > BayesianGreedy for a suciently long time horizon. For each algorithm
and each MAB instance, we compute the mean reputation score at each round, averaged over all mean
reward vectors. We plot the mean reputation trajectory: how this score evolves over time. We also plot
the trajectory for instantaneous rewards (not averaged over the previous time-periods), which provides
a beer view into algorithm’s performance at a given time.14 Figure 5 shows these trajectories for the
Needle-in-Haystack instance; for other MAB instances the plots are similar.
We summarize this nding as follows:
Finding 1. emean reputation trajectories and the instantaneous reward trajectories are arranged as predicted
by prior work: ThompsonSampling > BayesianEpsilonGreedy > BayesianGreedy for a suciently
long time horizon T .
We also use Figure 5 to choose a reasonable time-horizon for the subsequent experiments, as T = 2000.
e idea is, we want T to be large enough so that algorithms performance starts to plateau, but small
enough such that algorithms are still learning.
e mean reputation trajectory is probably the most natural way to represent an algorithm’s performance
on a given MAB instance. However, we found that the outcomes of the competition game are beer explained
14For “instantaneous reward” at a given time t, we report the average (over all mean reward vectors) of the mean rewards at
this time, instead of the average of the realized rewards, so as to decrease the noise.
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Figure 5: Mean reputation trajectory (le) and mean instantaneous reward trajectory (right) for Needle-in-Haystack. e shaded
area shows 95% condence intervals.
with a dierent “performance-in-isolation” statistic that is more directly connected to the game. Consider
the performance of two algorithms, Alg1 and Alg2, “in isolation” on a particular MAB instance. e relative
reputation of Alg1 (vs. Alg2) at a given time t is the fraction of mean reward vectors/realization tables for
which Alg1 has a higher reputation score than Alg2. e intuition is that agent’s selection in our model
depends only on the comparison between the reputation scores.
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Figure 6: Relative reputation trajectory for ThompsonSampling vs BayesianGreedy, on Uniform instance (le) and Needle-in-
Haystack instance (right). Shaded area display 95% condence intervals.
is angle allows a more nuanced analysis of reputation costs vs. benets under competition. Figure 6
(le) shows the relative reputation trajectory for ThompsonSampling vs BayesianGreedy for the Uniform
instance. e relative reputation is less than 12 in the early rounds, meaning that BayesianGreedy has
a higher reputation score in a majority of the simulations, and more than 12 later on. e reason is the
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Heavy-Tail Needle-in-Haystack
T0 = 20 T0 = 250 T0 = 500 T0 = 20 T0 = 250 T0 = 500
TS vs BG 0.29 ±0.03
EoG 55 (0)
0.72 ±0.02
EoG 570 (0)
0.76 ±0.02
EoG 620 (99)
0.64 ±0.03
EoG 200 (27)
0.6 ±0.03
EoG 370 (0)
0.64 ±0.03
EoG 580 (122)
TS vs BEG 0.3 ±0.03
EoG 37 (0)
0.88 ±0.01
EoG 480 (0)
0.9 ±0.01
EoG 570 (114)
0.57 ±0.03
EoG 150 (14)
0.52 ±0.03
EoG 460 (79)
0.56 ±0.02
EoG 740 (628)
BG vs BEG 0.62 ±0.03
EoG 410 (7)
0.6 ±0.02
EoG 790 (762)
0.57 ±0.03
EoG 730 (608)
0.46 ±0.03
EoG 340 (129)
0.42 ±0.02
EoG 650 (408)
0.42 ±0.02
EoG 690 (467)
Table 1: Simultaneous Entry, for Heavy-Tail and Needle-in-Haystack instances. Each cell describes a game between two
algorithms, call them Alg1 vs. Alg2, for a particular value of the warm start T0. Line 1 in the cell is the market share of Alg 1: the
average (in bold) and the 95% condence band. Line 2 species the “eective end of game” (EoG): the average and the median (in
brackets). e time horizon is T = 2000.
exploration in ThompsonSampling leads to worse decisions initially, but allows for beer decisions later.
e time period when relative reputation vs. BayesianGreedy dips below 12 can be seen as an explanation
for the competitive disadvantage of exploration. Such period also exists for the Heavy-Tail MAB instance.
However, it does not exist for the Needle-in-Haystack instance, see Figure 6.15
Finding 2. Exploration can lead to relative reputation vs. BayesianGreedy going below 12 for some initial
time period. is happens for some MAB instances but not for some others.
Denition 5.1. For a particular MAB algorithm, a time period when relative reputation vs. BayesianGreedy
goes below 12 is called exploration disadvantage period. An MAB instance is called exploration-disadvantaged
if such period exists.
Uniform and Heavy-tail instance are exploration-disadvantaged, but Needle-in-Haystack is not.
5.3 Competition vs. Better Algorithms
Our main experiments are with the duopoly game dened in Section 3. As the “intensity of competition”
varies from monopoly to “incumbent” to simultaneous entry duopoly to “late entrant”, we nd a stylized
inverted-U relationship as in Figure 1. More formally, we look for equilibria in the duopoly game, where
each rm’s choices are limited to BayesianGreedy, BayesianEpsilonGreedy and ThompsonSampling.
We do this for each “intensity level” and each MAB instance, and look for ndings that are consistent across
MAB instances. For cleaner results, we break ties towards less advanced algorithms (as they tend to have
lower adoption costs Agarwal et al. (2017)). Note that BayesianGreedy is trivially the dominant strategy
under monopoly.
Simultaneous entry. e basic scenario is when both rms are competing from round 1. A crucial
distinction is whether an MAB instance is exploration-disadvantaged:
Finding 3. Under simultaneous entry:
(a) (BayesianGreedy,BayesianGreedy) is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for exploration-
disadvantaged MAB instances with a suciently small “warm start”.
15We see two explanations for this: ThompsonSampling identies the best arm faster for the Needle-in-Haystack instance,
and there are no “very bad” arms which make exploration very expensive in the short term.
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(b) is is not necessarily the case for MAB instances that are not exploration-disadvantaged. In particular,
ThompsonSampling is a weakly dominant strategy for Needle-in-Haystack.
We investigate the rms’ market shares when they choose dierent algorithms (otherwise, by symmetry
both rms get half of the agents). We report the market shares for Heavy-Tail and Needle-in-Haystack in-
stances in Table 1 (see the rst line in each cell), for a range of values of the warm start T0. Table 2 reports sim-
ilarly on the Uniform instance. We nd that BG is a weakly dominant strategy for the Heavy-Tail and Uniform
instances, as long as T0 is suciently small. However, ThompsonSampling is a weakly dominant strategy
for the Needle-in-Haystack instance. We nd that for a suciently small T0, BayesianGreedy yields more
than half the market against ThompsonSampling, but achieves similar market share vs. BayesianGreedy
and BayesianEpsilonGreedy. By our tie-breaking rule, (BayesianGreedy,BayesianGreedy) is the only
pure-strategy equilibrium.
T0 = 20 T0 = 250 T0 = 500
TS vs BG 0.46 ±0.03 0.52 ±0.02 0.6 ±0.02
TS vs BEG 0.41 ±0.03 0.51 ±0.02 0.55 ±0.02
BG vs BEG 0.51 ±0.03 0.48 ±0.02 0.45 ±0.02
Table 2: Simultaneous entry, for the Uniform MAB instance. Semantics are the same as in Table 1.
We aribute the prevalence of BayesianGreedy on exploration-disadvantaged MAB instances to its
prevalence on the initial “exploration disadvantage period”, as described in Section 5.2. Increasing the
warm start length T0 makes this period shorter: indeed, considering the relative reputation trajectory in
Figure 6 (le), increasing T0 eectively shis the starting time point to the right. is is why it helps
BayesianGreedy if T0 is small.
First-Mover. We turn our aention to the rst-mover scenario. Recall that the incumbent rm enters the
market and serves as a monopolist until the entrant rm enters at round X . We make X large enough,
but still much smaller than the time horizon T . We nd that the incumbent is incentivized to choose
ThompsonSampling, in a strong sense:
Finding 4. Under rst-mover, ThompsonSampling is the dominant strategy for the incumbent. is holds
across all MAB instances, if X is large enough.
e simulation results for the Heavy-Tail MAB instance are reported in Table 3, for a particularX = 200.
We see that ThompsonSampling is a dominant strategy for the incumbent. Similar tables for the other
MAB instances and other values of X are reported in the supplement, with the same conclusion.
TS BEG BG
TS 0.003±0.003 0.083±0.02 0.17±0.02
BEG 0.045±0.01 0.25±0.02 0.23±0.02
BG 0.12±0.02 0.36±0.03 0.3±0.02
Market share of row player (entrant), 200 round head-start, Heavy-Tail Instance
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Beer algorithms
monopoly incumbent sim. entry entrant
Figure 7: A stylized “inverted-U relationship” between strength of competition and “level of innovation”.
BayesianGreedy is a weakly dominant strategy for the entrant, for Heavy-Tail instance in Table 3
and the Uniform instance, but not for the Needle-in-Haystack instance. We aribute this nding to
exploration-disadvantaged property of these two MAB instance, for the same reasons as discussed above.
Finding 5. Under rst-mover, BayesianGreedy is a weakly dominant strategy for the entrant for exploration-
disadvantaged MAB instances.
Inverted-U relationship. We interpret our ndings through the lens of the inverted-U relationship be-
tween the “intensity of competition” and the “quality of technology”. e lowest level of competition
is monopoly, when BayesianGreedy wins out for the trivial reason of tie-breaking. e highest levels
are simultaneous entry and “late entrant”. We see that BayesianGreedy is incentivized for exploration-
disadvantaged MAB instances. In fact, incentives for BayesianGreedy get stronger when the model
transitions from simultaneous entry to “late entrant”.16 Finally, the middle level of competition, “incum-
bent” in the rst-mover regime creates strong incentives for ThompsonSampling. In stylized form, this
relationship is captured in Figure 7.17
Our intuition for why incumbency creates more incentives for exploration is as follows. During the
period in which the incumbent is the only rm in the market, reputation consequences of exploration
vanish. Instead, the rm wants to improve its performance as much as possible by the time competition
starts. Essentially, the rm only faces a classical explore-exploit trade-o, and is incentivized to choose
algorithms that are best at optimizing this trade-o.
Death spiral eect. Further, we investigate the “death spiral” eect mentioned in the Introduction.
Restated in terms of our model, the eect is that one rm aracts new customers at a lower rate than the
other, and falls behind in terms of performance because the other rm has more customers to learn from,
and this gets worse over time until (almost) all new customers go to the other rm. With this intuition in
mind, we dene eective end of game (EoG) for a particular mean reward vector and realization table, as
the last round t such that the agents at this and previous round choose dierent rms. Indeed, the game,
eectively, ends aer this round. We interpret low EoG as a strong evidence of the “death spiral” eect.
16For the Heavy-Tail instance, BayesianGreedy goes from a weakly dominant strategy to a strictly dominant one. For the
Uniform instance, BayesianGreedy goes from a Nash equilibrium strategy to a weakly dominant one.
17We consider the monopoly scenario for comparison only, without presenting any ndings. We just assume that a monopolist
chooses the greedy algorithm, because it is easier to deploy in practice. Implicitly, users have no “outside option”: the service
provided is an improvement over not having it (and therefore the monopolist is not incentivized to deploy beer learning
algorithms). is is plausible with free ad-supported platforms such as Yelp or Google.
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Figure 8: Smoothed welfare plots resulting from equilibrium strategies in the dierent market structures. Note that welfare at
t = 0 incorporates the regret incurred during the incumbent and warm start periods. e ompson Sampling trajectory displays
the regret incurred by running ompson Sampling in isolation on the given instances.
Focusing on the simultaneous entry scenario, we specify the EoG values in Table 1 (the second line of each
cell). We nd that the EoG values are indeed small:
Finding 6. Under simultaneous entry, EoG values tend to be much smaller than the time horizon T .
We also see that the EoG values tend to increase as the warm start T0 increases. We conjecture this is
because larger T0 tends to be more benecial for a beer algorithm (as it tends to follow a beer learning
curve). Indeed, we know that the “eective end of game” in this scenario typically occurs when a beer
algorithm loses, and helping it delays the loss.
Welfare implications. We study the eects of competition on consumer welfare: the total reward collected
by the users over time. Rather than welfare directly, we nd it more lucid to consider market regret:
T maxa µ(a)−
∑
t∈[T ] µ(at),
where at is the arm chosen by agent t. is is a standard performance measure in the literature on
multi-armed bandits. Note that smaller regret means higher welfare.
We assume that both rms play their respective equilibrium strategies for the corresponding competition
level. As discussed previously, these are:
• BayesianGreedy in the monopoly,
• BayesianGreedy for both rms in simultaneous entry (Finding 3),
• ThompsonSampling for the incumbent (Finding 4) and BayesianGreedy for the entrant in rst-
mover (Finding 5).
Figure 8 displays the market regret (averaged over multiple runs) under dierent levels of competition.
Consumers are beer o in the rst-mover case than in the simultaneous entry case. Recall that under
rst-mover, the incumbent is incentivized to play ThompsonSampling. Moreover, we nd that the welfare
is close to that of having a single rm for all agents and running ThompsonSampling. We also observe
that monopoly and simultaneous entry achieve similar welfare.
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Figure 9: Average welfare and EoG as we increase the number of rms playing BayesianGreedy
Finding 7. In equilibrium, consumer welfare is (a) highest under rst-mover, (b) similar for monopoly and
simultaneous entry.
Finding 7(b) is interesting because, in equilibrium, both rms play BayesianGreedy in both seings, and
one might conjecture that the welfare should increase with the number of rms playing BayesianGreedy.
Indeed, one run of BayesianGreedy may get stuck on a bad arm. However, two rms independently
playing BayesianGreedy are less likely to get stuck simultaneously. If one rm gets stuck and the other
does not, then the laer should aract most agents, leading to improved welfare.
To study this phenomenon further, we go beyond the duopoly seing to more than two rms playing
BayesianGreedy (and starting at the same time). Figure 9 reports the average welfare across these
simulations. Welfare not only does not get beer, but is weakly worse as we increase the number of rms.
Finding 8. When all rms deploy BayesianGreedy, and start at the same time, welfare is weakly decreasing
as the number of rms increases.
We track the average EoG in each of the simulations and notice that it increases with the number of
rms. is observation also runs counter of the intuition that with more rms running BayesianGreedy,
one of them is more likely to “get lucky” and take over the market (which would cause EoG to decrease with
the number of rms).
5.4 Data as a Barrier to Entry
In the rst-mover regime, the incumbent can explore without incurring immediate reputational costs, and
build up a high reputation before the entrant appears. us, the early entry gives the incumbent both a
data advantage and a reputational advantage over the entrant. We explore which of the two factors is more
signicant. Our ndings provide a quantitative insight into the role of the classic “rst mover advantage”
phenomenon in the digital economy.
For a more succinct terminology, recall that the incumbent enjoys an extended warm start of X + T0
rounds. Call the rst X of these rounds the monopoly period (and the rest is the proper “warm start”). e
rounds when both rms are competing for customers are called competition period.
We run two additional experiments to isolate the eects of the two advantages mentioned above. e
data-advantage experiment focuses on the data advantage by, essentially, erasing the reputation advantage.
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Namely, the data from the monopoly period is not used in the computation of the incumbent’s reputation
score. Likewise, the reputation-advantage experiment erases the data advantage and focuses on the reputation
advantage: namely, the incumbent’s algorithm ‘forgets’ the data gathered during the monopoly period.
We nd that either data or reputational advantage alone gives a substantial boost to the incumbent,
compared to simultaneous entry duopoly. e results for the Heavy-Tail instance are presented in Table 4,
in the same structure as Table 3. For the other two instances, the results are qualitatively similar.
Reputation advantage (only) Data advantage (only)
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.021±0.009 0.16±0.02 0.21 ±0.02 0.0096±0.006 0.11±0.02 0.18±0.02
BEG 0.26±0.03 0.3±0.02 0.26±0.02 0.073±0.01 0.29±0.02 0.25±0.02
BG 0.34±0.03 0.4±0.03 0.33±0.02 0.15±0.02 0.39±0.03 0.33±0.02
Table 4: Data advantage vs. reputation advantage experiment, on Heavy-Tail MAB instance. Each cell describes the duopoly game
between the entrant’s algorithm (the row) and the incumbent’s algorithm (the column). e cell species the entrant’s market
share for the rounds in which hit was present: the average (in bold) and the 95% condence interval. NB: smaller average is beer
for the incumbent.
We can quantitatively dene the data (resp., reputation) advantage as the incumbent’s market share
in the competition period in the data-advantage (resp., reputation advantage) experiment, minus the said
share under simultaneous entry duopoly, for the same pair of algorithms and the same problem instance. In
this language, our ndings are as follows.
Finding 9.
(a) Data advantage and reputation advantage alone are large, across all algorithms and MAB instances.
(b)e data advantage is larger than the reputation advantage when the incumbent chooses ThompsonSampling.
(c) e two advantages are similar in magnitude when the incumbent chooses BayesianEpsilonGreedy or
BayesianGreedy.
Our intuition for Finding 9(b) is as follows. Suppose the incumbent switches from BayesianGreedy to
ThompsonSampling. is switch allows the incumbent to explore actions more eciently – collect beer
data in the same number of rounds – and therefore should benet the data advantage. However, the same
switch increases the reputation cost of exploration in the short run, which could weaken the reputation
advantage.
5.5 Non-deterministic choice Model (HardMaxRandom)
Let us consider an extension in which the agents’ response function (2) is no longer deterministic. We
focus on HardMax&Random model, where each agent selects between the rms uniformly with probability
 ∈ (0, 1), and takes the rm with the higher reputation score with the remaining probability.
One can view HardMax&Random as a version of “warm start”, where a rm receives some customers
without competition, but these customers are dispersed throughout the game. e expected duration of
this “dispersed warm start” is T . If this quantity is large enough, we expect beer algorithms to reach
their long-term performance and prevail in competition. We conrm this intuition; we also nd that this
eect is negligible for smaller (but still relevant) values of  or T .
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Heavy-Tail (HMR with  = .1) Heavy-Tail (HM)
TS vs BG TS vs BEG BG vs BEG TS vs BG TS vs BEG BG vs BEG
T = 2000
0.43 ± 0.02
Var: 0.15
0.44 ± 0.02
Var: 0.15
0.6 ± 0.02
Var: 0.1
0.29 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
0.28 ± 0.03
Var: 0.19
0.63 ± 0.03
Var: 0.18
T = 5000
0.66 ± 0.01
Var: 0.056
0.59 ± 0.02
Var: 0.092
0.56 ± 0.02
Var: 0.098
0.29 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
0.29 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
0.62 ± 0.03
Var: 0.19
T = 10000
0.76 ± 0.01
Var: 0.026
0.67 ± 0.02
Var: 0.067
0.52 ± 0.02
Var: 0.11
0.3 ± 0.03
Var: 0.21
0.3 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
0.6 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
Table 5: HardMax (HM) and HardMax&Random (HMR) choice models on the Heavy-Tail MAB instance. Each cell describes the market
shares in a game between two algorithms, call them Alg1 vs. Alg2, at a particular value of t. Line 1 in the cell is the market share of
Alg 1: the average (in bold) and the 95% condence band. Line 2 species the variance of the market shares across the simulations.
e results reported here are with T0 = 20.
Uniform (HMR with  = .1) Needle-In-Haystack (HMR with  = .1)
TS vs BG TS vs BEG BG vs BEG TS vs BG TS vs BEG BG vs BEG
T = 2000
0.42 ± 0.02
Var: 0.13
0.45 ± 0.02
Var: 0.13
0.49 ± 0.02
Var: 0.093
0.55 ± 0.02
Var: 0.15
0.61 ± 0.02
Var: 0.13
0.46 ± 0.02
Var: 0.12
T = 5000
0.48 ± 0.02
Var: 0.089
0.53 ± 0.02
Var: 0.098
0.46 ± 0.02
Var: 0.072
0.56 ± 0.02
Var: 0.13
0.63 ± 0.02
Var: 0.12
0.43 ± 0.02
Var: 0.11
T = 10000
0.54 ± 0.01
Var: 0.055
0.6 ± 0.02
Var: 0.073
0.44 ± 0.02
Var: 0.064
0.58 ± 0.02
Var: 0.083
0.65 ± 0.02
Var: 0.096
0.4 ± 0.02
Var: 0.1
Table 6: HardMax&Random (HMR) choice model for Uniform and Needle-In-Haystack MAB instances.
Finding 10. TS is weakly dominant under HardMax&Random, if and only if T is suciently large. Moreover,
HardMax&Random leads to lower variance in market share, compared to HardMax.
Table 5 shows the average market shares under HardMax vs HardMax&Random. In contrast to what
happens under HardMax, TS becomes weakly dominant under HardMax&Random, as T gets suciently
large. ese ndings hold across all problem instances, see Table 6 (with the same semantics as in Table 5).
However, it takes a signicant amount of randomness and a relatively large time horizon for this eect
to take place. Even with T = 10000 and  = 0.1 we see that BEG still outperforms BG on the Heavy-Tail
MAB instance as well as that TS only starts to become weakly dominant at T = 10000 for the Uniform
MAB instance.
5.6 Performance in Isolation, Revisited
We saw in Section 5.3 that mean reputation trajectories do not suce to explain the outcomes under
competition. Let us provide more evidence and intuition for this.
Mean reputation trajectories are so natural that one is tempted to conjecture that they determine the
outcomes under competition. More specically:
Conjecture 5.2. If one algorithm’s mean reputation trajectory lies above another, perhaps aer some
initial time interval (e.g., as in Figure 5), then the rst algorithm prevails under competition, for a suciently
large warm start T0.
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However, we nd a more nuanced picture. For example, in Figure 1 we see that BayesianGreedy
aains a larger market share than BayesianEpsilonGreedy even for large warm starts. We nd that this
also holds for K = 3 arms and longer time horizons, see the supplement for more details. We conclude:
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Figure 10: Reputation scores for Needle-in-Haystack at t = 500 (le), Reputation dierence ThompsonSampling −
BayesianGreedy for Needle-in-Haystack (right). Both are smoothed using a kernel density estimate.
Finding 11. Conjecture 5.2 is false: mean reputation trajectories do not suce to explain the outcomes under
competition.
To see what could go wrong with Conjecture 5.2, consider how an algorithm’s reputation score is
distributed at a particular time. at is, consider the empirical distribution of this score over dierent mean
reward vectors.18 For concreteness, consider the Needle-in-Haystack instance at time t = 500, ploed in
Figure 10 (le). (e other MAB instances lead to a similar intuition.)
We see that the “naive” algorithms BayesianGreedy and BayesianEpsilonGreedy have a bi-modal
reputation distribution, whereas ThompsonSampling does not. e reason is that for this MAB instance,
BayesianGreedy either nds the best arm and sticks to it, or gets stuck on the bad arms. In the former case
BayesianGreedy does slightly beer than ThompsonSampling, and in the laer case it does substantially
worse. However, the mean reputation trajectory may fail to capture this complexity since it simply takes
average over dierent mean reward vectors. is may be inadequate for explaining the outcome of the
duopoly game, given that the laer is determined by a simple comparison between the rm’s reputation
scores.
To further this intuition, consider the dierence in reputation scores (reputation dierence) between
ThompsonSampling and BayesianGreedy on a particular mean reward vector. Let’s plot the empirical
distribution of the reputation dierence (over the mean reward vectors) at a particular time point. Figure 10
(right) shows such plots for several time points. We observe that the distribution is skewed to the right,
precisely due to the fact that BayesianGreedy either does slightly beer than ThompsonSampling or
does substantially worse. erefore, the mean is not a good measure of the central tendency, or typical
value, of this distribution.
18Recall that each mean reward vector in our experimental setup comes with one specic realization table.
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6 Conclusions
We study the tension between exploration and competition. We consider a stylized duopoly model in which
two rms face an identical multi-armed bandit problem and compete for a stream of users. A rm makes
progress on its learning problem if and only if it aracts users. We investigate two variants: an analytical
variant where users do not observe any performance signals and choose between rms according to their
Bayesian-expected rewards, and numerical simulations where a reputation score is observed for each rm,
based on the average reward of its recent users. In both variants, rms are incentivized to adopt a “greedy
algorithm” which does no purposeful exploration and leads to welfare losses for users. We then consider
two relaxations of competition: we relax users’ rationality and give one of the rms a rst-mover advantage.
Both relaxations induce rms to adopt “beer” bandit algorithms, which benets user welfare.
Our results have two economic interpretations. e rst is that they can be framed in terms of the classic
inverted-U relationship between innovation and competition, where innovation refers to the adoption of
beer bandit algorithms. Unlike other models in the literature, what prevents innovation is not its direct
costs, but the short-term reputation consequences of exploration. e second interpretation concerns
the role of data in the digital economy. We nd that even a small initial disparity in data or reputation
gets amplied under competition to a very substantial dierence in the eventual market share. us, we
endogenously obtain “network eects” without explicitly baking them into the model, and elucidate the
role of data as a barrier to entry.
With this paper as a common departure point, there are several exciting directions to explore:
• Prices. When the rms can set prices, they may be able to compensate early users for exploration, and
potentially prevent the “death spiral” eects. Whereas our paper zeroes in on competition between
free, ad-supported platforms that primarily compete on quality.
• Horizontal dierentiation. Horizontally dierentiated user preferences may help explain how compe-
tition may encourage specialization, i.e., how the rms may learn to specialize under competition.
• Continuous learning. While we focus on learning from scratch in a mainly stationary world, another
well-motivated regime is continuous learning, when exploration counteracts change (Slivkins and
Upfal, 2008). e economic story would be about competition between relatively mature rms.
• Real-life data. Numerical experiments based on real-life datasets would arguably be more realistic.
To deal with real-life datasets, bandit algorithms would probably need to accommodate change over
time and contexts (auxiliary signals available before each round).
One diculty with the last two directions is that the bandit “side” of the model becomes considerably
more complicated, both in terms of the rewards and in terms of the algorithms. Indeed, there are many
reasonable ways to model a changing world (resp., dependence on contexts), and several substantially
dierent algorithmic approaches to deal with these models. Consequently, the distinctions between beer
and worse algorithms are not as clear and well-established.
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Appendix A Background for non-specialists: multi-armed bandits
We present self-contained background on multi-armed bandits (MAB), to make the paper accessible to
researchers who are not experts on MAB. We focus on the three classes of MAB algorithms listed in
Section 1.1: adaptive-exploration algorithms, exploration-separating algorithms, and greedy algorithms.
We list the precise upper and lower bounds on the regret rates only to illustrate how the three algorithm
classes are separated from one another; the exact results are not essential for the paper.
We use standard conventions: O(f(t)) and Ω(f(t)) means at most (resp., at least) f(n), up to constant
factors, starting from large enough t. Likewise, O˜(f(t)) notation suppresses the polylog(t) factors.
Fundamentals. We are concerned with the following problem. ere are T rounds and K arms to choose
from. In each round t ∈ [T ], the algorithm chooses an arm and receives a reward rt ∈ [0, 1] for this arm,
drawn from a xed but unknown distribution.19 e algorithm’s goal is to maximize the total reward.
A standard performance measure is regret, dened as the dierence in the total expected reward between
the algorithm and the best arm. In a formula, regret is T ·maxarms a µa − E
[∑
t∈[T ] rt
]
, where µa is the
mean reward of arm a. Normalized by the best arm, regret allows to compare algorithms across dierent
problem instances. e primary concern is the asymptotic growth rate of regret as a function of T .
e three classes of algorithms perform very dierently in terms of regret: adaptive-exploration
algorithms are by far the best, greedy algorithms are by far the worst, and exploration-separating ones
are in the middle. Adaptive-exploration algorithms achieve optimal regret rates: O˜(
√
KT ) for all problem
instances, and simultaneously a vastly improved regret rate of O(K∆ log T ) for all problem instances with
gap ≥ ∆ (“easy” instances), without knowing the ∆ in advance (Lai and Robbins, 1985; Auer et al.,
2002a,b).20 Exploration-separating algorithms can only achieve regret O˜(T 2/3) across all problem instances.
ey can achieve the “gap-dependent” regret rate stated above, but only if they know the ∆ in advance,
and with terrible regret Ω(∆T ) for some other problem instances (Babaio et al., 2014). Finally, the greedy
algorithm is terrible on a wide variety of problem instances, in the sense that with constant probability it
fails to try the best arm even once, and therefore suers regret Ω(T ) (see Chapter 11.2 in Slivkins, 2019).
e optimal regret rates are achieved by several adaptive-exploration algorithms, of which the most
known are ompson Sampling (ompson, 1933; Russo et al., 2018),21 UCB1 (Auer et al., 2002a), and
Successive Elimination (Even-Dar et al., 2006). ere is a substantial amount of follow-up work on rening
these regret rates, but it is not as relevant to this paper.
Exploration-separating algorithms completely separate exploration and exploitation. Ahead of time,
each round is either selected for exploration, in which case the distribution over arms does not depend on
the observed data, or it is assigned to exploitation, in which case the data from this round is discarded. e
simplest approach, called Explore-First, explores uniformly for a predetermined number of rounds, then
chooses one arm for “exploitation” and uses it from then on. A more rened approach, called Epsilon-Greedy,
explores uniformly in each round with a predetermined probability, and “exploits” with the remaining
probability. Both algorithms, and the associated O˜(T 2/3) regret bounds, have been “folklore knowledge”
for decades. e general denition of “exploration-separating algorithms” and the associated lower bounds
trace back to Babaio et al. (2014).22
19All “negative” results (i.e., lower bounds on regret) assume reward distributions with constant variance.
20e gap is the dierence in mean reward between the best arm and the second-best arm.
21While ompson Sampling is the rst and arguably best-known bandit algorithm, the corresponding regret bounds have
been proved relatively recently (Agrawal and Goyal, 2012; Kaufmann et al., 2012; Agrawal and Goyal, 2013).
22Babaio et al. (2014) consider a closely related, but technically dierent seing, which can be easily “translated” into ours
(either as a corollary or as another application of the same proof technique). Detailing this is beyond the scope of this appendix.
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Advanced aspects. Switching from “greedy” to “exploration-separating” to “adaptive-exploration” algo-
rithms involves substantial adoption costs in infrastructure and personnel training (Agarwal et al., 2017).
Inserting exploration into a complex decision-making pipeline necessitates a substantial awareness of the
technology and a certain change in a mindset for the personnel, as well as an infrastructure to collect
and analyze the data. Adaptive exploration requires the said infrastructure to propagate the data analysis
back to the “front-end” where the decisions are made, and do it on a suciently fast and regular cadence.
Framing the problem (in terms of the appropriate modeling assumptions and action features) and debugging
the machine learning code tend to be quite subtle, too.
e lower bounds mentioned above are fairly typical, in the sense that they hold for a wide variety of
problem instances, even though they are usually (and most cleanly) presented as worst-case. e Ω(
√
T )
lower bound from Auer et al. (2002b) can be extended to hold for most problem instances, in the following
sense: for each instance I there exists a “decoy instance” I ′ such that any algorithm incurs regret Ω(√T )
on at least one of them. e “gap-dependent” lower bound of Ω(K∆ log T ) in fact holds for all problem
instances and all algorithms that are not terrible on the large-gap instances (Lai and Robbins, 1985). e
Ω(T 2/3) lower bound for exploration-separating algorithms in fact applies to all problem instances, as long
as the algorithm achieves O˜(T 2/3) regret rate in the worst case (Babaio et al., 2014). Moreover, there is
a tradeo between the worst-case upper bound on the regret rate and a lower bound that applies for all
problem instances (eorem 4.3 in Babaio et al., 2014, using the same proof technique).
Some MAB algorithms are Bayesian, e.g., ompson Sampling, in the sense that they input a prior on
mean rewards, and aain strong Bayesian guarantees (in expectation over the prior) when the prior is
correct. Such algorithms can also be initialized with some simple ‘fake’ priors; in fact, ompson Sampling
satises the optimal regret bounds listed above.
e intuition on (the separation between) the three algorithm classes applies more generally, far beyond
the basic MAB model discussed above. In particular, all algorithms that we explicitly mentioned are in
fact general algorithmic techniques that are known to extend to a variety of more general MAB scenarios,
typically with a similarly stark separation in regret bounds.
e greedy algorithm can perform well sometimes in a more general model of contextual bandits, where
auxiliary payo-relevant signals, a.k.a. contexts, are observed before each round. is phenomenon has
been observed in practice (Biei et al., 2018), and in theory (Kannan et al., 2018; Bastani et al., 2018; Raghavan
et al., 2018) under (very) substantial assumptions. e prevalent intuition is that the diversity of contexts
can — under some conditions and to a limited extent — substitute for explicit exploration.
Instantaneous regret. Cumulative performance measures such as regret are not quite appropriate for our
seing, as we need to characterize interactions in particular rounds. Instead, our theoretical results focus
on Bayesian instantaneous regret (BIR), as dened in Section 4.1. Recall that we posit a Bayesian prior on
the mean reward vectors. In the notation of this appendix, the BIR is simply:
BIR(t) := E
prior
[
max
arms a
µa − rt
]
.
Note that Bayesian regret (i.e., regret in expectation over the prior) is precisely
BReg(T ) := E
prior
[
T · max
arms a
µa −
T∑
t=1
rt
]
=
T∑
t=1
BIR(t). (19)
We are primarily interested in how fast BIR decreases with t, treating K as a constant.
e three classes of algorithms are well-separated in terms of BIR, much like they are in terms of regret.
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• BayesianGreedy has at least a constant BIR for many reasonable priors (where the constant can
depend on K and the prior, but not on t). e reason and the proof are exactly the same as for regret.
• Exploration-separating algorithms can achieve BIR(t) = O˜
(
t−1/3
)
for all priors, e.g., by using
Epsilon-Greedy algorithm with exploration probability t = t−1/3 in each round t. In the typical
scenario when BReg(t) ≥ Ω(t2/3), the BIR rate of t−1/3 cannot be improved by (19), in the following
sense: if BIR(t) = O˜ ( t−γ ) for all t, then γ ≥ 1/3.
• Adaptive-exploration algorithms can have an even beer regret rate: BIR(t) = O˜
(
t−1/2
)
. is holds
for Successive Elimination (Even-Dar et al., 2006) and for ompson Sampling (see Appendix B).23
Any optimal MAB algorithm enjoys this regret rate “on average” by (19), since BReg(T ) ≤ O˜(√T ).
In particular, if such algorithm satises BIR(t) = O˜ ( t−γ ) for all t, then γ ≤ 1/2.
is theoretical intuition is supported by our numerical simulations: see Figure 6 and Appendix E.1.
Appendix B Monotone MAB algorithms
is appendix provides some auxiliary results on Bayesian-monotonicity of some standard algorithms:
BayesianGreedy, BayesianEpsilonGreedy and ThompsonSampling. e former is needed in Section 4,
the last two merely add motivation for our theoretical story. e result on ThompsonSampling also implies
that BIR(t) ≤ O˜(t−1/2). Recall that an algorithm is called Bayesian-monotone if its Bayesian-expected
reward is non-decreasing in time.
We consider Bayesian MAB with Bernoulli rewards. ere are T rounds and K arms. In each round
t ∈ [T ], the algorithm chooses an arm at ∈ A and receives a reward rt ∈ {0, 1} for this arm, drawn from a
xed but unknown distribution. e set of all arms is A; mean reward of arm a is denoted µa. e mean
reward vector µ = (µa : a ∈ A) is drawn from a common Bayesian prior Pmean. We let rew(t) = µat
denote the instantaneous mean reward of the algorithm.
Monotonicity for the greedy algorithm. We state the monotonicity-in-information result for the
“Bayesian-greedy step”: informally, exploitation can only get beer with more data. We invoke this result
directly in Section 4, and use it to derive monotonicity of BayesianGreedy and BayesianEpsilonGreedy.
A formal statement needs some scaolding. e n-step history is the random sequence Hn =
( (at, rt) : t ∈ [n] ). Realizations of Hn are called realized histories. Let Hn be the set of all possible
values of Hn. e Bayesian-greedy step given an n-step history h ∈ Hn is dened as
BG(h) := argmax
a∈A
E [µa | Hn = h ] , ties broken arbitrarily.
(However, recall that such ties are ruled out by Assumption 4.) Now, the result is as follows:
Lemma B.1 (Mansour et al. (2016)). Let h, h′ be two realized histories such that h is a prex of h′. en
E
[
µBG(h)
] ≤ E [µBG(h′) ] .
Corollary B.2. BayesianGreedy is Bayesian-monotone. Moreover, E[rew(n)] strictly increases in each time
step n with Pr[an 6= an+1] > 0.
23However, such result is not known for UCB1 algorithm, to the best of our knowledge.
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Proof. Bayesian-monotonicity follows directly. e “strictly increases” statement holds because the arm
chosen in a given round has a strictly largest Bayesian-expected reward for that round.
Monotonicity for Epsilon-Greedy. Lemma B.1 immediately implies monotonicity of BayesianEpsilonGreedy,
for a generic choice of exploration probabilities. Recall that in each round t, BayesianEpsilonGreedy
algorithm explores uniformly with a predetermined probability t, and “exploits” with the remaining
probability using the Bayesian-greedy step: at = BG(current data).
CorollaryB.3. BayesianEpsilonGreedy is Bayesian-monotone whenever probabilities t are non-increasing.
Monotonicity and BIR of ThompsonSampling. Monotonicity follows from Sellke and Slivkins (2020);
the BIR result is an immediate corollary given that BReg(t) ≤ O˜(√t) for all steps t (Russo and Roy, 2014).
Neither result has appeared in print, to the best of our knowledge.
eorem B.4 (Sellke and Slivkins (2020)). Assume the prior Pmean is independent across arms. en
ThompsonSampling is Bayesian-monotone. Consequently, it satises BIR(t) ≤ O˜(t−1/2).
e theorem follows easily from two observations in Sellke and Slivkins (2020), we provide the proof for
completeness. First, let us state the algorithm. Let Prt and Et denote, resp., Bayesian posterior probability
and expectation conditional on the history observed at time t. Let a∗ be the best arm: a∗ ∈ argmaxa µa. In
each round t, ThompsonSampling samples arm at from the posterior distribution pt(a) = Prt[a∗ = a].
Proof of eorem B.4. e two observations from Sellke and Slivkins (2020) are as follows: for each arm a,
(i) E [µa | at = a ] Pr[at = a] = E [Ht,a ], where Ht,a := Et[µa] Prt[at = a].
(ii) e process (Ht,a : t ∈ N) is a submartingale.
We use these observations as follows:
E[rew(t)] =
∑
arms a
E [µa | at = a ] Pr[at = a] =
∑
arms a
E [Ht,a ] (by (i))
E[rew(t+ 1)] =
∑
arms a
E [Ht+1, a ] ≥
∑
arms a
E [Ht,a ] = E[rew(t)] (by (ii))
Appendix C Non-degeneracy via a random perturbation
We provide two examples when Assumption (4) holds almost surely under a small random perturbation of
the prior. We posit Bernoulli rewards, and assume that the prior Pmean is independent across arms.
Beta priors. Suppose the mean reward µa for each arm a is drawn from some Beta distribution Beta(αa, βa).
Given any history H that contains ha number of heads and ta number of tails from arm a, the posterior
mean reward is E[µa | H] = αa+haαa+ha+βa+ta . erefore, perturbing the parameters αa and βa independently
with any continuous noise will induce a prior with property (4) with probability 1.
A prior with a nite support. Consider the probability vector in the prior for arm a:
~pa = ( Pr[µa = ν] : ν ∈ support(µa) ) .
We apply a small random perturbation independently to each such vector:
~pa ← ~pa + ~qa, where ~qa ∼ Na. (20)
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Here Na is the noise distribution for arm a: a distribution over real-valued, zero-sum vectors of dimension
da = |support(µa)|. We need the noise distribution to satisfy the following property:
∀x ∈ [−1, 1]da \ {0} Pr
q∼Na
[x · (~pa + q) 6= 0] = 1. (21)
eorem C.1. Consider an instance of MAB with 0-1 rewards. Assume that the prior Pmean is independent
across arms, and each mean reward µa has a nite support that does not include 0 or 1. Assume that noise
distributionsNa satisfy property (21). If random perturbation (20) is applied independently to each arm a, then
Eq. (4) holds almost surely for each history h.
Remark C.2. As a generic example of a noise distribution which satises Property (21), consider the uniform
distribution N over the bounded convex set Q =
{
q ∈ Rda | q ·~1 = 0 and ‖q‖2 ≤ 
}
, where ~1 denotes
the all-1 vector. If x = a~1 for some non-zero value of a, then (21) holds because x · (p+ q) = x · p = a 6= 0.
Otherwise, denote p = ~pa and observe that x · (p+ q) = 0 only if x · q = c , x · (−p). Since x 6= ~1, the
intersection Q∩{x · q = c} either is empty or has measure 0 in Q, which implies Prq [x · (p+ q) 6= 0] = 1.
To prove eorem C.1, it suces to focus on two arms, and perturb one. Since realized rewards have
nite support, there are only nitely many possible histories. So, it suces to focus on a xed history h.
Lemma C.3. Consider an instance of MAB with Bernoulli rewards. Assume that the prior Pmean is independent
across arms, and that support(µ1) is nite and does not include 0 or 1. Suppose random perturbation (20) is
applied to arm 1, with noise distribution N1 that satises (21). en E[µ1 | h] 6= E[µ2 | h] almost surely for
any xed history h.
Proof. Note that E[µa | h] does not depend on the algorithm which produced this history. erefore, for the
sake of the analysis, we can assume w.l.o.g. that this history has been generated by a particular algorithm, as
long as this algorithm can can produce this history with non-zero probability. Let us consider the algorithm
that deterministically chooses same actions as h. Let S = support(µ1). en:
E[µ1 | h] =
∑
ν∈S ν · Pr[µ1 = ν | h]
=
∑
ν∈S ν · Pr[h | µ1 = ν] · Pr[µ1 = ν] / Pr[h],
Pr[h] =
∑
ν∈S Pr[h | µ1 = ν] · Pr[µ1 = ν].
erefore, E[µ1 | h] = E[µ2 | h] if and only if∑
ν∈S(ν − C) · Pr[h | µ1 = ν] · Pr[µ1 = ν] = 0, where C = E[µ2 | h].
Since E[µ2 | h] and Pr[h | µ1 = ν] do not depend on the probability vector ~p1, we conclude that
E[µ1 | h] = E[µ2 | h] ⇔ x · ~p1 = 0,
where vector
x := ( (ν − C) · Pr[h | µ1 = ν] : ν ∈ S ) ∈ [−1, 1]d1
does not depend on ~p1.
us, it suces to prove that x · ~p1 6= 0 almost surely under the perturbation. In a formula:
Pr
q∼N1
[x · (~p1 + q) 6= 0] = 1 (22)
Note that Pr[h | µ1 = ν] > 0 for all ν ∈ S, because 0, 1 6∈ S. It follows that at most one coordinate of
x can be zero. So (22) follows from property (21).
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Appendix D Full proofs for Section 4
Some notation. Without loss of generality, we label actions as A = [K] and sort them according to their
prior mean rewards, so that E[µ1] > E[µ2] > . . . > E[µK ].
Fix principal i ∈ {1, 2} and (local) step n. e arm chosen by algorithm algi at this step is denoted
ai,n, and the corresponding BIR is denoted BIRi(n). History of algi up to this step is denoted Hi,n.
Fix agent t. Recall that ni(t) denotes the number of global rounds before t in which principal i is chosen.
Let Ni,t denote the distribution of ni(t).
Write PMR(a | E) = E[µa | E] for posterior mean reward of action a given event E.
Cherno Bounds. We use an elementary concentration inequality known as Cherno Bounds, in a
formulation from Mitzenmacher and Upfal (2005).
eorem D.1 (Cherno Bounds). Consider n i.i.d. random variables X1 . . . Xn with values in [0, 1]. Let
X = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi be their average, and let ν = E[X]. en:
min ( Pr[X − ν > δν], Pr[ν −X > δν] ) < e−νnδ2/3 for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
D.1 Main result on HardMax: Proof of eorem 4.2
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Since the two algorithms coincide on the rst n0 − 1 steps, it follows by symmetry
that histories H1,n0 and H2,n0 have the same distribution. We use a coupling argument: w.l.o.g., we assume
the two histories coincide, H1,n0 = H2,n0 = H .
At local step n0, BayesianGreedy chooses an action a1,n0 = a1,n0(H) which maximizes the posterior
mean reward given history H : for any realized history h ∈ support(H) and any action a ∈ A
PMR(a1,n0 | H = h) ≥ PMR(a | H = h). (23)
By assumption (4), it follows that
PMR(a1,n0 | H = h) > PMR(a | H = h) for any h ∈ support(H) and a 6= a1,n0(h). (24)
Since the two algorithms deviate at step n0, there is a set S ⊂ support(H) of step-n0 histories such
that Pr[S] > 0 and any history h ∈ S satises Pr[a2,n0 6= a1,n0 | H = h] > 0. Combining this with (24),
PMR(a1,n0 | H = h) > E
[
µa2,n0 | H = h
]
for each history h ∈ S. (25)
Using (23) and (25) and integrating over realized histories h, we obtain rew1(n0) > rew2(n0).
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Let us use induction on round t ≥ t0, with the base case t = t0. Let N = N1,t0 be
the agents’ posterior distribution for n1,t0 , the number of global rounds before t0 in which principal 1 is
chosen. By induction, all agents from t0 to t− 1 chose principal 1, so PMR2(t0) = PMR2(t). erefore,
PMR1(t) = E
n∼N
[rew1(n+ 1 + t− t0)] ≥ E
n∼N
[rew1(n+ 1)] = PMR1(t0) > PMR2(t0) = PMR2(t),
where the rst inequality holds because alg1 is Bayesian-monotone, and the second one is the base case.
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Proof of eorem 4.2. Since the two algorithms coincide on the rst n0 − 1 steps, it follows by symmetry
that rew1(n) = rew2(n) for any n < n0. By Lemma 4.4, rew1(n0) > rew2(n0).
Recall that ni(t) is the number of global rounds s < t in which principal i is chosen, and Ni,t is
the agents’ posterior distribution for this quantity. By symmetry, each agent t < n0 chooses a principal
uniformly at random. It follows that N1,n0 = N2,n0 (denote both distributions by N for brevity), and
N (n0 − 1) > 0. erefore:
PMR1(n0) = E
n∼N
[rew1(n+ 1)] =
n0−1∑
n=0
N (n) · rew1(n+ 1)
> N (n0 − 1) · rew2(n0) +
n0−2∑
n=0
N (n) · rew2(n+ 1)
= E
n∼N
[rew2(n+ 1)] = PMR2(n0) (26)
So, agent n0 chooses principal 1. By Lemma 4.5 (noting that BayesianGreedy is Bayesian-monotone), all
subsequent agents choose principal 1, too.
D.2 HardMax with biased tie-breaking: Proof of eorem 4.7
e proof re-uses Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5, which do not rely on fair tie-breaking.
Recall that it is the principal chosen in a given global round t. Because of the biased tie-breaking,
if PMR1(t) ≥ PMR2(t) then Pr[it = 1] > 12 . (27)
Letm0 be the rst step when alg2 deviates from BayesianGreedy, or BayesianGreedy deviates from
StaticGreedy, whichever comes sooner. en alg2, BayesianGreedy and StaticGreedy coincide on
the rst m0 − 1 steps. Moreover, m0 ≤ n0 (since BayesianGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy at step
n0), so alg1 coincides with BayesianGreedy on the rst m0 steps.
So, rew1(n) = rew2(n) for each step n < m0, because alg1 and alg2 coincide on the rstm0−1 steps.
Moreover, if alg2 deviates from BayesianGreedy at step m0 then rew1(m0) > rew2(m0) by Lemma 4.4;
else, we trivially have rew1(m0) = rew2(m0). To summarize:
rew1(n) ≥ rew2(n) for all steps n ≤ m0. (28)
We claim that Pr[it = 1] > 12 for all global rounds t ≤ m0. We prove this claim using induction on t.
e base case t = 1 holds by (27) and the fact that in step 1, BayesianGreedy chooses the arm with the
highest prior mean reward. For the induction step, we assume that Pr[it = 1] > 12 for all global rounds
t < t0, for some t0 ≤ m0. It follows that distribution N1,t0 stochastically dominates distribution N2,t0 .24
Observe that
PMR1(t0) = E
n∼N1,t0
[rew1(n+ 1)] ≥ E
n∼N2,t0
[rew2(n+ 1)] = PMR2(t0). (29)
So the induction step follows by (27). Claim proved.
Now let us focus on global round m0, and denote Ni = Ni,m0 . By the above claim,
N1 stochastically dominates N2, and moreover Ni(m0 − 1) > Ni(m0 − 1). (30)
24For random variables X,Y on R, we say that X stochastically dominates Y if Pr[X ≥ x] ≥ Pr[Y ≥ x] for any x ∈ R.
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By denition of m0, either (i) alg2 deviates from BayesianGreedy starting from local step m0, which
implies rew1(m0) > rew2(m0) by Lemma 4.4, or (ii) BayesianGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy
starting from local step m0, which implies rew1(m0) > rew1(m0 − 1) by Lemma B.2. In both cases, using
(28) and (30), it follows that the inequality in (29) is strict for t0 = m0.
erefore, agent m0 chooses principal 1, and by Lemma 4.5 so do all subsequent agents.
D.3 e main result for HardMax&Random: Proof of eorem 4.8
Without loss of generality, assume m0 = n0. Consider global round t ≥ n0. Recall that each agent chooses
principal 1 with probability at least fresp(−1) > 0.
en E[n1(t + 1)] ≥ 20 t. By Cherno Bounds (eorem D.1), we have that n1(t + 1) ≥ 0t holds
with probability at least 1− q, where q = exp(−0t/12).
We need to prove that PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) > 0. For any m1 and m2, consider the quantity
∆(m1,m2) := BIR2(m2 + 1)− BIR1(m1 + 1).
Whenever m1 ≥ 0t/2− 1 and m2 < t, it holds that
∆(m1,m2) ≥ ∆(0t/2, t) ≥ BIR2(t)/2.
e above inequalities follow, resp., from algorithms’ Bayesian-monotonicity and (8). Now,
PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) = E
m1∼N1,t, m2∼N2,t
[∆(m1,m2)]
≥ −q + E
m1∼N1,t, m2∼N2,t
[∆(m1,m2) | m1 ≥ 0t/2− 1]
≥ BIR2(t)/2− q
> BIR2(t)/4 > 0 (by Eq. (9)).
D.4 For HardMax&Random, a little greedy goes a long way (Proof of eorem 4.11)
Let rewgr(n) denote the Bayesian-expected reward of the “greedy choice” aer aer n− 1 steps of alg1.
Note that rew1(·) and rewgr(·) are non-decreasing: the former because alg1 is Bayesian-monotone and the
laer because the “greedy choice” is only improved with an increasing set of observations, see Lemma B.1.
Using (10), we conclude that the greedy modication alg2 is Bayesian-monotone.
By denition of the “greedy choice,” rew1(n) ≤ rewgr(n) for all steps n. Moreover, by Lemma 4.4,
alg1 has a strictly smaller rew(n0) compared to BayesianGreedy; so, rew1(n0) < rew2(n0).
Let alg denote a copy of alg1 that is running “inside” alg2. Let m2(t) be the number of global rounds
before t in which the agent chooses principal 2 and alg is invoked; i.e., it is the number of agents seen by
alg before global round t. LetM2,t be the agents’ posterior distribution for m2(t).
We claim that in each global round t ≥ n0, distributionM2,t stochastically dominates distributionN1,t,
and PMR1(t) < PMR2(t). We use induction on t. e base case t = n0 holds becauseM2,t = N1,t (because
the two algorithms coincide on the rst n0 − 1 steps), and PMR1(n0) < PMR2(n0) is proved as in (26), using
the fact that rew1(n0) < rew2(n0).
e induction step is proved as follows. e induction hypothesis for global round t− 1 implies that
agent t− 1 is seen by alg with probability (1− 0)(1− p), which is strictly larger than 0, the probability
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with which this agent is seen by alg2. erefore,M2,t stochastically dominates N1,t.
PMR1(t) = E
n∼N1,t
[rew1(n+ 1)]
≤ E
m∼M2,t
[rew1(m+ 1)] (31)
< E
m∼M2,t
[
(1− p) · rew1(m+ 1) + p · rewgr(m+ 1)
]
(32)
= PMR2(t).
Here inequality (31) holds because rew1(·) is Bayesian-monotone andM2,t stochastically dominates N1,t,
and inequality (32) holds because rew1(n0) < rew2(n0) andM2,t(n0) > 0.25
D.5 SoftMax: proof of eorem 4.17
Let β1 = min{c′0δ0, β0/20} with δ0 dened in (11). Recall each agent chooses alg1 with probability at least
fresp(−1) = 0. By By condition (14) and the fact that BIR1(n)→ 0, there exists some suciently large T1
such that for any t ≥ T1, BIR1(0T1/2) ≤ β1/c′0 and BIR2(t) > e−0t/12. Moreover, for any t ≥ T1, we
know E[n1(t+ 1)] ≥ 0 t, and by the Cherno Bounds (eorem D.1), we have n1(t+ 1) ≥ 0t/2 holds
with probability at least 1− q1(t) with q1(t) = exp(−0t/12) < BIR2(t). It follows that for any t ≥ T1,
PMR2(t)− PMR1(t) = E
m1∼N1,t, m2∼N2,t
[BIR1(m1 + 1)− BIR2(m2 + 1)]
≤ q1(t) + E
m1∼N1,t
[BIR1(m1 + 1) | m1 ≥ 0t/2− 1]− BIR2(t)
≤ BIR1(0T1/2) ≤ β1/c′0
Since the response function fresp is c′0-Lipschitz in the neighborhood of [−δ0, δ0], each agent aer round
T1 will choose alg1 with probability at least
pt ≥ 12 − c′0 (PMR2(t)− PMR1(t)) ≥ 12 − β1.
Next, we will show that there exists a suciently large T2 such that for any t ≥ T1 + T2, with high
probability n1(t) > max{n0, (1− β0)n2(t)}, where n0 is dened in (13). Fix any t ≥ T1 + T2. Since each
agent chooses alg1 with probability at least 1/2− β1, by Cherno Bounds (eorem D.1) we have with
probability at least 1− q2(t) that the number of agents that choose alg1 is at least β0(1/2− β1)t/5, where
q2(x) = exp
(−1/3 (1/2− β1)(1− β0/5)2x ) .
Note that the number of agents received by alg2 is at most T1 + (1/2 + β1)t+ (1/2− β1)(1− β0/5)t.
en as long as T2 ≥ 5T1β0 , we can guarantee that n1(t) > n2(t)(1−β0) and n1(t) > n0 with probability
at least 1− q2(t) for any t ≥ T1 + T2. Note that the weak BIR-dominance condition in (13) implies that for
any t ≥ T1 + T2 with probability at least 1− q2(t), we have BIR1(n1(t)) < (1− α0) BIR2(n2(t)).
It follows that for any t ≥ T1 + T2,
PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) = E
m1∼N1,t, m2∼N2,t
[BIR2(m2 + 1)− BIR1(m1 + 1)]
≥ (1− q2(t))α0 BIR2(t)− q2(t) ≥ α0 BIR2(t)/4,
where the last inequality holds as long as q2(t) ≤ α0BIR2(t)/4, and is implied by the condition in (14) as
long as T2 is suciently large. Hence, by the denition of our SoftMax response function and assumption
in (11), we have Pr[it = 1] ≥ 1/2 + 1/4 c0 α0 BIR2(t).
25If rew1(·) is strictly increasing, then inequality (31) is strict, too; this is becauseM2,t(t− 1) > N1,t(t− 1).
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Appendix E Full experimental results
In this appendix we provide full results for the experiments described in Section 5.
E.1 “Performance In Isolation” (Section 5.2)
We present the full plots for Section 5.2: mean reputation trajectories and instantaneous reward trajectories
for all three MAB instances. For “instantaneous reward” at a given time t, we report the average (over all
mean reward vectors) of the mean rewards at this time, instead of the average of the realized rewards, so as
to decrease the noise. In all plots, the shaded area represents 95% condence interval.
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Figure 11: Mean Reputation (le) and Mean Instantaneous Reward (right) for Heavy Tail Instance
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
R
ep
ut
at
io
n
Algorithm BEG BG TS
Mean Reputation − Needle In Haystack
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
In
st
an
ta
ne
ou
s 
R
ew
a
rd
Algorithm BEG BG TS
Mean Instantaneous Reward − Needle In Haystack
Figure 12: Mean Reputation (le) and Mean Instantaneous Reward (right) for Needle In Haystack Instance
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Figure 13: Mean Reputation (le) and Mean Instantaneous Reward (right) for Uniform Instance
E.2 First-mover regime (Section 5.3)
We present additional experiments on the rst-mover regime from Section 5.3, across various MAB instances
and various values of the incumbent advantage parameter X .
Each experiment is presented as a table with the same semantics as in the main text. Namely, each cell
in the table describes the duopoly game between the entrant’s algorithm (the row) and the incumbent’s
algorithm (the column). e cell species the entrant’s market share (fraction of rounds in which it was
chosen) for the rounds in which he was present. We give the average (in bold) and the 95% condence
interval. NB: smaller average is beer for the incumbent.
X = 50 X = 200
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.054 ±0.01 0.16 ±0.02 0.18 ±0.02 0.003 ±0.003 0.083 ±0.02 0.17 ±0.02
BEG 0.33 ±0.03 0.31 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02 0.045 ±0.01 0.25 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02
BG 0.39 ±0.03 0.41 ±0.03 0.33 ±0.02 0.12 ±0.02 0.36 ±0.03 0.3 ±0.02
Table 7: Heavy-Tail MAB Instance
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X = 300 X = 500
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.0017 ±0.002 0.059 ±0.01 0.16 ±0.02 0.002 ±0.003 0.043 ±0.01 0.16 ±0.02
BEG 0.029 ±0.007 0.23 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.03 ±0.007 0.21 ±0.02 0.24 ±0.02
BG 0.097 ±0.02 0.34 ±0.03 0.29 ±0.02 0.091 ±0.01 0.32 ±0.03 0.3 ±0.02
Table 8: Heavy-Tail MAB Instance
X = 50 X = 200
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.34 ±0.03 0.4 ±0.03 0.48 ±0.03 0.17 ±0.02 0.31 ±0.03 0.41 ±0.03
BEG 0.22 ±0.02 0.34 ±0.03 0.42 ±0.03 0.13 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02 0.36 ±0.03
BG 0.18 ±0.02 0.28 ±0.02 0.37 ±0.03 0.093 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.03
Table 9: Needle In Haystack MAB Instance
X = 300 X = 500
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.1 ±0.02 0.28 ±0.03 0.39 ±0.03 0.053 ±0.01 0.23 ±0.02 0.37 ±0.03
BEG 0.089 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.36 ±0.03 0.051 ±0.01 0.2 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.03
BG 0.05 ±0.01 0.21 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.03 0.031 ±0.009 0.18 ±0.02 0.31 ±0.02
Table 10: Needle In Haystack MAB Instance
X = 50 X = 200
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.27 ±0.03 0.21 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02 0.12 ±0.02 0.16 ±0.02 0.2 ±0.02
BEG 0.39 ±0.03 0.3 ±0.03 0.34 ±0.03 0.25 ±0.02 0.24 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
BG 0.39 ±0.03 0.31 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.24 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
Table 11: Uniform MAB Instance
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X = 300 X = 500
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.094 ±0.02 0.15 ±0.02 0.2 ±0.02 0.061 ±0.01 0.12 ±0.02 0.2 ±0.02
BEG 0.2 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02 0.17 ±0.02 0.21 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
BG 0.21 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02 0.18 ±0.02 0.22 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
Table 12: Uniform MAB Instance
E.3 Reputation Advantage vs. Data Advantage (Section 5.4)
is section presents full experimental results on reputation advantage vs. data advantage.
Each experiment is presented as a table with the same semantics as in the main text. Namely, each cell
in the table describes the duopoly game between the entrant’s algorithm (the row) and the incumbent’s
algorithm (the column). e cell species the entrant’s market share for the rounds in which hit was
present: the average (in bold) and the 95% condence interval. NB: smaller average is beer for the
incumbent.
Data Advantage Reputation Advantage
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.0096 ± 0.006 0.11 ± 0.02 0.18 ± 0.02 0.021 ± 0.009 0.16 ± 0.02 0.21 ± 0.02
BEG 0.073 ± 0.01 0.29 ± 0.02 0.25 ± 0.02 0.26 ± 0.03 0.3 ± 0.02 0.26 ± 0.02
BG 0.15 ± 0.02 0.39 ± 0.03 0.33 ± 0.02 0.34 ± 0.03 0.4 ± 0.03 0.33 ± 0.02
Table 13: Heavy Tail MAB Instance, X = 200
Data Advantage Reputation Advantage
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.0017 ±0.002 0.06 ±0.01 0.18 ±0.02 0.022 ±0.009 0.13 ±0.02 0.21 ±0.02
BEG 0.04 ±0.009 0.24 ±0.02 0.25 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.03 0.29 ±0.02 0.28 ±0.02
BG 0.12 ±0.02 0.35 ±0.03 0.33 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.03 0.39 ±0.03 0.34 ±0.02
Table 14: Heavy Tail MAB Instance, X = 500
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Data Advantage Reputation Advantage
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.25 ± 0.03 0.36 ± 0.03 0.45 ± 0.03 0.35 ± 0.03 0.43 ± 0.03 0.52 ± 0.03
BEG 0.21 ± 0.02 0.32 ± 0.03 0.41 ± 0.03 0.26 ± 0.03 0.36 ± 0.03 0.43 ± 0.03
BG 0.18 ± 0.02 0.29 ± 0.03 0.4 ± 0.03 0.19 ± 0.02 0.3 ± 0.02 0.36 ± 0.02
Table 15: Needle-in-Haystack MAB Instance, X = 200
Data Advantage Reputation Advantage
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.098 ±0.02 0.27 ±0.03 0.41 ±0.03 0.29 ±0.03 0.44 ±0.03 0.52 ±0.03
BEG 0.093 ±0.02 0.24 ±0.02 0.38 ±0.03 0.19 ±0.02 0.35 ±0.03 0.42 ±0.03
BG 0.064 ±0.01 0.22 ±0.02 0.37 ±0.03 0.15 ±0.02 0.27 ±0.02 0.35 ±0.02
Table 16: Needle-in-Haystack MAB Instance, X = 500
Data Advantage Reputation Advantage
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.2 ± 0.02 0.22 ± 0.02 0.27 ± 0.03 0.27 ± 0.03 0.23 ± 0.02 0.27 ± 0.02
BEG 0.33 ± 0.03 0.32 ± 0.03 0.35 ± 0.03 0.4 ± 0.03 0.3 ± 0.02 0.32 ± 0.02
BG 0.32 ± 0.03 0.31 ± 0.03 0.35 ± 0.03 0.36 ± 0.03 0.29 ± 0.02 0.3 ± 0.02
Table 17: Uniform MAB Instance, X = 200
Data Advantage Reputation Advantage
TS BEG BG TS BEG BG
TS 0.14 ±0.02 0.18 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.03 0.24 ±0.02 0.2 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02
BEG 0.26 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02 0.34 ±0.03 0.37 ±0.03 0.29 ±0.02 0.31 ±0.02
BG 0.25 ±0.02 0.27 ±0.02 0.34 ±0.03 0.35 ±0.03 0.27 ±0.02 0.3 ±0.02
Table 18: Uniform MAB Instance, X = 500
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E.4 Mean Reputation vs. Relative Reputation
We present the experiments omied from Section 5.6. Namely, experiments on the Heavy-Tail MAB
instance with K = 3 arms, both for “performance in isolation” and the permanent duopoly game. We nd
that BayesianEpsilonGreedy > BayesianGreedy according to the mean reputation trajectory but that
BayesianGreedy > BayesianEpsilonGreedy according to the relative reputation trajectory and in the
competition game. As discussed in Section 5.6, the same results also hold for K = 10 for the warm starts
that we consider.
e result of the permanent duopoly experiment for this instance is shown in Table 19.
Heavy-Tail
T0 = 20 T0 = 250 T0 = 500
TS vs. BG 0.4 ±0.02
EoG 770 (0)
0.59 ±0.01
EoG 2700 (2979.5)
0.6 ±0.01
EoG 2700 (3018)
TS vs. BEG 0.46 ±0.02
EoG 830 (0)
0.73 ±0.01
EoG 2500 (2576.5)
0.72 ±0.01
EoG 2700 (2862)
BG vs. BEG 0.61 ±0.01
EoG 1400 (556)
0.61 ±0.01
EoG 2400 (2538.5)
0.6 ±0.01
EoG 2400 (2587.5)
Table 19: Duopoly Experiment: Heavy-Tail, K = 3, T = 5000.
Each cell describes a game between two algorithms, call them Alg1 vs. Alg2, for a particular value of the warm start T0. Line 1 in
the cell is the market share of Alg 1: the average (in bold) and the 95% condence band. Line 2 species the “eective end of game”
(EoG): the average and the median (in brackets).
e mean reputation trajectories for algorithms’ performance in isolation and the relative reputation
trajectory of BayesianEpsilonGreedy vs. BayesianGreedy:
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Figure 14: Mean reputation (le) and relative reputation trajectory (right) for Heavy-Tail, K = 3
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